AI agent scope of action
An agent's scope of change is a per-tool list of the systems it touches and the one kind of change each tool makes: read, comment, ticket, configure, block or delete. OWASP LLM06:2025, read 19 Nov 2026, traces excessive agency to three roots: functionality, permissions and autonomy.
The two questions
- Q02. Which production systems and which kinds of change (read, comment, ticket, configure, block, delete) is the agent allowed to touch, written down per tool?
- Q03. Does any tool give the agent an open-ended capability (run a shell command, fetch any URL) where a narrow function would do?
Q02 asks for a register. Q03 asks what to do with the entries that no register row can describe. Together they turn "the agent has access to our ticketing system" into a list a reviewer can approve or strike line by line.
What a good answer contains
- Every tool the harness exposes has a row, including tools that came with a framework by default.
- Each row names one system and one of the six kinds. A row that says "any", or needs two kinds, is a Q03 finding: split it into two tools.
- Open-ended capabilities (shell, arbitrary URL fetch) are absent, or carry a written reason, a named owner and a date by which they are replaced.
- The register is stored where the harness reads it, so the tool list and the document cannot drift apart.
What the requirement says
OWASP states the cause plainly: "The root cause of Excessive Agency is typically one or more of: excessive functionality; excessive permissions; excessive autonomy." Its first mitigation is to "Limit the extensions that LLM agents are allowed to call to only the minimum necessary." Its example is narrow: an extension that reads a mailbox to summarize emails "may only require the ability to read emails, so the extension should not contain other functionality such as deleting or sending messages" (OWASP LLM06:2025, read 19 Nov 2026).
On open-ended tools OWASP says to "Avoid the use of open-ended extensions where possible (e.g., run a shell command, fetch a URL, etc.) and use extensions with more granular functionality." If a file write is built on a shell command, "the scope for undesirable actions is very large (any other shell command could be executed)"; a file-writing function that does only that is the safer build.
A register that uses the six kinds
The checklist names six kinds but does not define them. This page reads them as follows. Read: no state changes. Comment: adds text to an existing record. Ticket: creates a record that a person must act on, including a pull request. Configure: changes a setting on a system. Block: adds an entry to a deny list. Delete: removes data or a record.
| Tool | System | Kind | Limit written in the tool | Undo |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| read_finding | Scanner API | Read | Findings of the 4 projects assigned to the job | Not needed |
| add_ticket_comment | Queue SEC-VULN | Comment | Tickets the agent opened | Comment deleted by an owner |
| open_fix_request | Source repository | Ticket | Pushes one branch named agent/ plus the CVE id and opens one pull request; cannot merge | Close the request |
| set_asset_tag | Asset inventory | Configure | One tag key, patch-window; value from a fixed list of 3 | Previous value is in the log |
| block_package_version | Artifact registry | Block | One named package version per call; no wildcards | Remove the deny entry |
| delete_agent_branch | Source repository | Delete | Only branches under agent/ that the agent created | Restore from the commit id in the log |
Worked example: replacing a shell tool with narrow functions
A triage agent shipped with one general tool, run_shell. Q03 flags it. The method: export every call of the last 30 days from the log and group them by what each call did.
| What the calls did | Calls | Kind | Narrow replacement |
|---|---|---|---|
| curl GET requests to the scanner API | 301 | Read | read_finding |
| git push and pull request creation (60 to agent/ branches, 2 to a colleague's feature branch) | 62 | Ticket | open_fix_request; the 2 pushes to a colleague's branch would now be refused |
| git branch -D on agent/ branches | 31 | Delete | delete_agent_branch |
| cat, jq and grep on exported files | 11 | Read | None: read_finding already returns what these read |
| kubectl get deployment, to see which image tag runs | 7 | Read | read_deployed_image (a seventh row, Kubernetes, read only) |
Two results matter. First, 100% of the calls fit a read, ticket or delete tool, so run_shell can be removed instead of wrapped. Second, the 30 days contain no call that is a configure or a block, so set_asset_tag and block_package_version stay in the register only if the job specification names a need for them; otherwise the reviewer strikes both rows. The two pushes to a colleague's branch are the reason the open_fix_request limit names the agent/ prefix: the shell allowed them, and nobody had approved them.
How to test it on your own systems, and how it fails
- Export the tool list the running agent actually receives, not the design document, and diff it against the register. Any tool in one and not the other is a finding. Owner: the harness maintainer. Record: the diff, dated, kept with the register.
- For every open-ended tool, group the last 30 days of calls as in the table above and write each distinct purpose as a narrow function. A purpose that cannot be written as one function stays a Q03 finding with a written reason, a named owner and a replacement date. Owner: the tool's owner. Record: the grouping table and the finding.
- Ask the owner of each downstream system to confirm the kind of change in the register against what the agent's account can do. Owner: that system's owner. Record: the confirmation, with the date and the account checked.
- Run the diff again whenever a tool is added, and after every framework or SDK upgrade; re-evaluating after model changes lists the triggers. Owner: whoever approves the change. Record: the new diff, signed off before release.
The usual failure is drift. A framework upgrade or a new integration adds a default tool, the register still lists six rows, and nobody reviews the seventh until it is used. Step 1 catches it only if it runs on every upgrade, which is why step 4 ties the diff to the release and not to a calendar.
How tool lists are built is in the agent harness section on tools and permissions; the use-case map shows which jobs vendors describe as read-only and which as write.
Sources
- OWASP, LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency, prevention and mitigation strategies, read 19 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026