Human in the loop vs human on the loop for security agents
In the loop, a person approves each action before it runs; on the loop, the agent acts and a person supervises and can stop it. Human Rights Watch fixed the split on 19 Nov 2012. Four actions from the OpenSSH flaw CVE-2026-123158 show the test: a one-host snooze starts in the loop and can move on the loop only after evidence, and closing a finding never does.
The terms as first published
The three-way split comes from weapons policy, not software. Human Rights Watch's report Losing Humanity (19 November 2012) defines human-in-the-loop weapons as robots that "can select targets and deliver force only with a human command", and human-on-the-loop weapons as those that act "under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robots' actions". Out of the loop means no human involvement.
The report adds the warning that matters for software: some on-the-loop systems are "effectively out-of-the-loop weapons because the supervision is so limited". A supervisor who cannot keep up with the volume, or cannot see what the system did, is a person reading a log after the fact. Apply that test to any security agent that runs without a per-action approval.
What each mode is made of
Agent SDKs implement the first mode as an interrupt. The OpenAI Agents SDK pauses a run "until a person approves or rejects sensitive tool calls", and approval rules written as code fail closed: a malformed argument forces manual approval rather than running. LangChain's middleware offers four decisions: approve, edit, reject and respond. Editing is the useful one in security work, because a reviewer can narrow a proposed scope instead of discarding the action. The per-harness details are on approvals and checkpoints; how to build the screen is in human approval design.
On the loop has no pause. The agent acts under rules, and the human's tools are the log, a sample and a stop control. Claude's Agent SDK has a mode, dontAsk, that "never prompts": it denies any call no rule has allowed and runs the calls the rules do allow. There is no approver, so it is not in the loop. It is on the loop only if a named person reads the log of what the allowed rules did.
Four actions from one exploited flaw
CVE-2026-123158 affects OpenSSH before 10.6p2 on Linux built against musl libc without PAM. The fix and the Alpine packages were released on 5 Nov 2026, first exploitation was recorded on 7 Nov, and CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 9 Nov with a due date of 12 Nov 2026, three days later. A vulnerability agent working this advisory would propose actions of very different weight. The mode column is this site's judgment from the test below, not a published rule.
| Action | Reversible and narrow? | Mode | Who reads, how often | On a bad action | Record kept |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Snooze the finding on one host for 7 days because that host uses glibc or PAM, with the reason attached. The agent makes one snooze per host and finding; a rule that snoozes every glibc or PAM host at once is a class of assets and stays in the loop. OpenSSH's announcement says: "This vulnerability does not exist on non-Linux systems, Linux/glibc systems and Linux systems that use PAM for password authentication" (openssh-unix-dev, 5 Nov 2026) | Yes: one finding on one host, it returns on its date and the host does not change | In the loop: the autonomy levels page rates snoozing to a date 9, which keeps it in the loop. On the loop only after the evidence described there | Vulnerability owner approves the day's snooze list each morning, and a snooze takes effect on approval | Reject; the finding stays open. Add the missed condition to the agent's rules and review the previous 7 days of snoozes | Per snooze: host, the glibc or PAM evidence, time, rules version; plus the owner's approval and any edit |
| Close those host findings for good | No: closing ends the one record that says the finding is open, and on a known exploited CVE a wrong closure is a missed deadline (CISA catalog: due 12 Nov 2026) | In the loop, always | Vulnerability owner approves the list of snoozed findings when the 7 days end; the agent never closes alone | Reject the list; the finding stays open | Approver's name, the list, the date, the evidence attached to each line |
| Run the Alpine package upgrade and restart sshd on one production host | Partly: sessions keep running, but sshd is down briefly and a downgrade is a second change | In the loop for the first 10 hosts. Further hosts from the same image group move on the loop only if all 10 upgrades were approved without edits, none needed a rollback and the previous package is staged so that the undo is one step; if any of the three fails, the action stays in the loop | Host owner approves before the restart. Alpine's advisory: "update openssh now and restart sshd. Upgrading the package alone does not replace the running daemon." | Reject with reason; edit the host list | Approver, host, package version before and after, restart time |
| Set PasswordAuthentication no on hosts that cannot upgrade | No: nobody can log in with a password, and a mistake can lock out administrators | In the loop, every host | Named approver confirms key login works in a second session first. Alpine's advisory gives the change itself: "If you cannot update yet, at least disable password logins: set PasswordAuthentication no in your sshd configuration and restart sshd." | Reject; the agent proposes the host again only after the check is attached | Approver, host, the second-session check, time |
The closing row matches what an agent should never do alone, which keeps closing a finding for good with a named person. A level change for any of these actions is recorded the way the autonomy levels page describes.
If snoozing moved on the loop, the owner's check would become a log sample, and sizing it is arithmetic, not a feeling. If the agent snoozes 120 findings a day and a reviewer needs 2 minutes to judge one, reading all of them takes 4 hours, so a daily full read does not exist in practice and the pattern would be out of the loop under a kinder name. A sample of 59 takes about 2 hours and detects a 5% error rate with 95% probability (the derivation is in human approval design). The 2-minute figure is an assumption to replace with your own measurement.
A constructed case shows what the morning approval is for. On 9 Nov 2026 at 23:10 the agent proposes snoozing host app-gw-07 for 7 days, citing "glibc" from the host's ldd --version. At 08:30 on 10 Nov the vulnerability owner reads the day's list and sees that the evidence line names the host's libc, while the SSH service on that host runs in an Alpine container, which uses musl and no PAM. The owner rejects the snooze, so the finding never leaves the open list, the upgrade goes to the host owner for approval inside the CISA due date of 12 Nov, and a rule is added: the libc evidence must come from the process that listens on port 22, not from the host. The rules version recorded on each proposal is how the owner finds every other proposal made under the old rule: here, the other 3 that day.
A test for choosing on the loop
Choose on the loop only when all four hold. If any fails, use in the loop, or do not automate the action.
- The action can be undone by one named step that is itself low-risk.
- The action touches one asset or one finding, not a class of assets.
- You can state who reads the log, how often, and what they do on finding a bad action. If those three answers do not exist, the pattern is out of the loop.
- The volume the reviewer can actually read covers a sample large enough to find the error rate you can tolerate.
The same action can change mode over time. A team might keep the glibc snoozes in the loop, then move them on the loop once the evidence on the autonomy levels page is met and the revert rate has stayed below its limit, as in measuring an agent after it ships. The steps for rolling agents out in stages are in how to use agentic AI in cybersecurity, and the approval controls vendors shipped in recent weeks are in 14 dates to know.
Sources
- Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity, Definitions and Technology (19 Nov 2012), read 19 Nov 2026
- OpenAI Agents SDK, Human-in-the-loop, read 19 Nov 2026
- LangChain docs, Human-in-the-loop, interrupt decision types, read 19 Nov 2026
- Anthropic, Claude Agent SDK permissions, read 19 Nov 2026
- OpenSSH 10.6p2 release notes (CVE-2026-123158), read 19 Nov 2026
- Alpine Linux advisory, 5 Nov 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, version 2026.11.18, read 19 Nov 2026
- GreyNoise, first exploitation record for CVE-2026-123158 (7 Nov 2026), read 19 Nov 2026
- OpenSSH, urgent security release 10.6p2 announcement on openssh-unix-dev (5 Nov 2026), read 19 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026