# AI Agents for Vulnerability Triage and Remediation

As of 19 Nov 2026, 28 vendors publish an agent that triages scanner findings or moves them toward a fix. Approval sits in four places, and a dismissal needs one as much as a fix.

## Counts from the vendors directory

- 17 of 28 vendors let customers build or change the agent.
- 14 of 28 vendors describe an approval step.
- 17 of 28 vendors describe an audit trail.

Vendors: Aikido, Amplify Security, Astelia, Averlon, Backline, Checkmarx, Cogent Security, Corridor, CrowdStrike, Cycode, Dux Security, Endor Labs, GitHub, Maze, Microsoft, Onit Security, Pixee, ProjectDiscovery, Qualys, Rival Security, Seemplicity, Semgrep, Snyk, Tenable, Torq, Vicarius, Wiz, Zafran.

## What the agents do

The agents on this job start from scanner findings and add context: how the vulnerable component is used, whether it is reachable, how exposed the asset is and who owns it. Aikido's CVE agent "reads how the vulnerable package is used in your code" and runs each night on open findings in the scope an admin sets ([Aikido help](https://help.aikido.dev/aikido-agent/cve-exploitability-analysis.md)). Cycode's workflow page describes a template that targets new CVEs, analyzes them for exploitability, then "Escalate the ones that are exploitable, suppress the ones that are not" ([Cycode](https://cycode.com/agentic-workflows/)). What makes a triage tool an agent rather than automation is set out in [what agentic AI in cybersecurity is](/guides/what-is-agentic-ai-in-cybersecurity/).

Some vendors split the work across several agents. Onit lists discovery, ownership, exploitability, threat intelligence, prioritization, resolution, remediation and mitigation, which "each run as a dedicated agent, in parallel, sharing one context" ([Onit platform](https://onit.security/platform/)). ProjectDiscovery's Verification Agent is described as a "Post-execution judge that validates findings, re-tests independently, and files confirmed issues" ([Neo docs](https://docs.neo.projectdiscovery.io/platform/agents/analysis/verification-agent)). Pixee routes each finding "through three progressive tiers": deterministic analyzers first, then AI agents, then automatic handling of novel rule types ([Pixee FAQ](https://docs.pixee.ai/faq/general)).

What runs without a person is usually a setting. Tenable says scheduled agent runs are "automatically handling daily vulnerability triaging, health checks, and routine tasks without human delay" ([Tenable Hexa AI](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-one/capabilities/hexa-ai)). Torq lets customers "define remediation SLAs by risk level" and then tracks and escalates patching delays ([Torq](https://torq.io/blog/vulnerability-management-lifecycle/)). Cogent describes the path as earned: "start with recommendations and review, then expand what the system can do as trust grows" ([Cogent autonomy levels](https://www.cogent.com/ai/autonomy-levels)).

## Where a person approves

The vendors place the approval in one of four spots. The spot decides what the approver sees and how many decisions reach them.

1. **Per action.** Aikido lets an admin "Choose which actions run automatically and which require your approval" ([Aikido help](https://help.aikido.dev/aikido-agent/cve-exploitability-analysis.md)). Only workspace admins change those settings.
2. **By action type, severity or asset sensitivity.** Cogent: "Decide where agents act independently and where they pause for sign-off. Configure by action type, severity, or asset sensitivity." ([Cogent AI engine](https://www.cogent.com/ai/cogent-ai-engine)). CrowdStrike: "Actions can be set to execute autonomously or require human approval before running" ([CrowdStrike Charlotte AI](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/charlotte-ai/)).
3. **By confidence.** Wiz describes routing lower-confidence Green Agent remediation decisions to a developer in Slack for approval ([Wiz](https://www.wiz.io/blog/introducing-wiz-agents)). Cogent says "When an agent's confidence is low, it hands the call to a person instead of acting alone" ([Cogent](https://www.cogent.com/platform/cyber-defense-factory)). Cycode sets "confidence thresholds on every agent" ([Cycode](https://cycode.com/agentic-workflows/)).
4. **On the change itself.** Endor Labs offers to "Require approval before any file edit, branch push, or pull request" ([Endor Labs](https://www.endorlabs.com/solutions/agentic-remediation)). GitHub tells users: "Always review and test the generated changes before you merge the pull request" ([GitHub docs](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/code-scanning/autofix-for-code-scanning)).

A dismissal is also a change. Triage agents mostly remove work, so the approval question is what they may close. Aikido records an ignore with its reason, for example "Finding is ignored with the reason CVE determined not exploitable". Onit says approving a decision "creates a standing rule for every matching exposure, now and later" ([Onit](https://onit.security/blog/ai-agents-vulnerability-management/)), so the approver is approving a class of findings and should see how many assets the rule matches now. Microsoft's Intune agent shows the opposite design: an administrator follows the suggested steps and then "can mark it as applied to have the agent retain a record" ([Microsoft Learn](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/agents/vulnerability-remediation-agent)).

Stopping and reversing are documented less often than approving. CrowdStrike says "analysts can stop an agent mid-task or set AI credit limits for every agent and workflow" ([CrowdStrike](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/charlotte-ai/)). Qualys describes "automated rollback returns systems to a known-good state" ([Qualys TruRisk Eliminate](https://www.qualys.com/apps/trurisk-eliminate/)). Tenable Patch Management says "Schedule, pause, or roll back deployments in real-time" ([Tenable](https://www.tenable.com/products/patch-management)). Onit says every agent action "passes an approval gate, writes to an audit trail, and is reversible in one step" ([Onit platform](https://onit.security/platform/)). 14 of 28 vendors are not counted as describing an approval step for their triage agent, and the Approval step column gives each reason. For Amplify Security, Corridor, Dux, Microsoft, ProjectDiscovery and Seemplicity the pages describe no gate before the agent acts. For Averlon, Backline, Checkmarx, Pixee, Rival and Semgrep the pull request review belongs to a fix agent, and Vicarius's draft-then-publish step belongs to its ScriptAI disclosure agent. Torq's approval gates publishing an agent, not its actions.

## The record to keep for each decision

No vendor publishes a format for this. The list below combines what the vendors in the table say they log with the logging control in MITRE ATLAS (quoted in the risk section). Keep one record per decision, whether the agent closed, changed or only proposed.

Agent decision record, vulnerability triage and fix

- Finding ID and scanner source
- Agent name and version, and the model it ran on
- Inputs read (usage, reachability, configuration, network reach, ownership) with timestamps
- Decision: ignore, downgrade, upgrade, snooze, ticket, workaround, fix proposed
- Reason text written by the agent
- Rule created by this decision, if any, and how many assets it matches today
- Approver (named person) or "automatic under rule" with the rule ID
- Check after the change: rescan or version result from a source other than the agent
- Side effects the fix does not undo (for example credentials issued before the fix)
- Reversal: how to undo it and who may

## The risk, in the standards' words

OWASP defines the risk behind every approval gate: "Excessive Agency is the vulnerability that enables damaging actions to be performed in response to unexpected, ambiguous or manipulated outputs from an LLM, regardless of what is causing the LLM to malfunction." It names three root causes, "excessive functionality; excessive permissions; excessive autonomy", and lists as an example an extension that "fails to independently verify and approve high-impact actions" ([OWASP LLM06:2025](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/)). Its control is to "require a human to approve high-impact actions before they are taken."

MITRE ATLAS ties the amount of approval to the consequence: "Human In-the-Loop policies should follow the degree of consequence of the task at hand." It also asks for logging of "the intermediate steps of agentic actions and decisions, data access and tool use, installation commands, and identity of the agent" ([MITRE ATLAS data release 5.6.0](https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml), mitigations AML.M0029 and AML.M0024).

## Worked example: CVE-2026-82329 in self-hosted Artifactory

JFrog disclosed CVE-2026-82329 on 28 Aug 2026. On a default install the Artifactory Access service trusts an empty string as a join key, so an unauthenticated network caller can obtain an administrator token. The CNA rates it 9.8. JFrog fixed it in 7.111.21, 7.117.28, 7.125.20, 7.133.29, 7.146.38 and 7.161.20, and Artifactory Cloud was already fixed by JFrog. CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2 Sep 2026 ([CISA KEV](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-82329), [JFrog advisories](https://docs.jfrog.com/releases/docs/jfrog-security-advisories)).

Fastly's traffic data gives the clock an approval gate runs against ([Fastly, 3 Sep 2026](https://www.fastly.com/blog/cve-2026-82329-jfrog-artifactory-authentication-bypass-exploitation-activity)). No exploitation was detected on disclosure day, and there were only single-digit probes on 29 and 30 Aug. About 75,000 attempts arrived on 31 Aug, but nearly 98% of that volume came from offensive security vendors and research services, which Fastly says could easily be mistaken for the onset of malicious mass exploitation. Attempts rose to just above 171,000 on 1 Sep, after a public exploit was released, when actual exploitation became the dominant traffic, and peaked near 406,000 on 2 Sep.

Arithmetic from the dates above. The gate days are examples of approval cadences, not any vendor's setting.

| Gate clears on | Days before mass exploitation (Tue 1 Sep) | Relative to the 2 Sep peak and KEV listing |
|---|---|---|
| 28 Aug 2026 (same day) | 4 days before | 5 days before |
| 31 Aug 2026 (next business day) | 1 day before | 2 days before |
| 3 Sep 2026 (a weekly change review) | 2 days after | 1 day after |

What the agent has to read is also different here. A code-usage check, such as the one Aikido describes for libraries in your code, answers a different question from this finding, which sits in a self-hosted server product. The evidence for this CVE is the version, the join-key setting and network reach to the join endpoint (the preconditions in [the CVE record](https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-82329)). An agent may dismiss the Artifactory Cloud instance with the reason "already fixed by the vendor". It may not dismiss a self-hosted 7.146.30 instance (an example version below the 7.146.38 fix) on usage grounds, because the flaw is in the default configuration.

A finished record for that instance holds the decision "fix proposed: upgrade to 7.146.38, or add an additional join key as the interim workaround", the approver and the hour, and a check from a source other than the agent, such as the version the Artifactory version API returns ([JFrog API docs](https://docs.jfrog.com/administration/reference/getartifactoryversion)). It also holds the item a rescan cannot show: patching does not revoke tokens already issued, so the record stays open until the join key is rotated and tokens issued since 28 Aug 2026 are revoked ([Fastly](https://www.fastly.com/blog/cve-2026-82329-jfrog-artifactory-authentication-bypass-exploitation-activity)).

To run the same test on an agent you are evaluating, replay a finding whose outcome you already know and check four things. Does it stop at the gate you configured, and is the wait inside the window in the table? Does it give a reason for any dismissal that you can check against the version and configuration? Does it write the rule it created, with the number of assets matched? Does it leave the token revocation open? The [evaluation guide](/guides/evaluate-a-security-agent-on-your-findings/) covers building the replay set, and the [checklist on verifying after each change](/evaluation-checklist/verify-after-each-change/) covers the rescan.

## Vendors that publish an agent for this job

Alphabetical, the same fields for every vendor, from the vendor's own pages read on 19 Nov 2026. Quotes and claims are the vendor's. "None found on 19 Nov 2026" records that the pages read did not say, not that a feature is absent. The inclusion test and the counting rules are on the use-case matrix page, which also has the other fields for each vendor across all six jobs.

28 vendors with a published agent for vulnerability triage and remediation, alphabetical, read 19 Nov 2026.

| Vendor | Agents named for this job | Customer can build or change agents | Approval step | Evidence left | Stated limit | Sources (read 19 Nov 2026) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [Aikido](https://www.aikido.dev/) | Aikido Agent (CVE Exploitability Analysis): Reads how a vulnerable package is used in a repository or container and ignores, downgrades, upgrades or snoozes the CVE finding with a reason | Yes. Customers set severity scope, repositories, containers and allowed actions for the triage agent, and add custom instructions, branch names, commit messages and merge rules for AutoFix. Authoring new agents: none found on the pages read. | Described. Each allowed action can be set to Fully Automated or Human Approval; with approval the agent waits for a person to approve it from the analysis history. | Described. Each ignore, downgrade or upgrade carries an agent-provided reason, and runs can be reviewed in an analysis history. | The CVE triage agent is credit-based: each CVE it analyzes uses one credit, and only workspace admins change its settings. | [help.aikido.dev/aikido-agent/cve-exploitability-a...](https://help.aikido.dev/aikido-agent/cve-exploitability-analysis.md); [aikido.dev/code/autofix](https://www.aikido.dev/code/autofix) |
| [Amplify Security](https://amplify.security/) | Amplify Console triage and remediation agents: Takes alerts from any source, triages them against company priorities, and offers one-click remediations that can be customized | Yes. The product is a harness in which the customer writes its own agents, skills and detections. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 on the home, products or docs landing pages for an approval step. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for a log of agent decisions; the products page only mentions audit-ready narrative reports. | Access is by request: each team is reviewed by hand and gets a dedicated engineer. | [amplify.security/products](https://amplify.security/products); [amplify.security](https://amplify.security/) |
| [Astelia](https://www.astelia.io/) | The Investigator (Automated Triage): Triages each new vulnerability by reachability and operational impact, validates it and coordinates next steps; The Fixer (Agentic Remediation): Picks the fastest fix (patch, firewall or IPS rule) and carries it out through the existing stack with a person in the loop | Yes. The launch post says customers describe a workflow in plain language to a planner agent, can create agents from scratch, or adjust templates from a marketplace. | Described. In the post's example workflow, a drafted ticket and a proposed firewall rule wait in an approval queue for a person to click. | Described. Post says each step is recorded in an execution log and each decision in an audit log. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for code pull requests on the pages read: fixes described are patches through patch tools, firewall and IPS rules, and tickets. | [astelia.io/use-cases/deploy-astelia-agents](https://www.astelia.io/use-cases/deploy-astelia-agents); [astelia.io/post/closing-the-exposure-loop](https://www.astelia.io/post/closing-the-exposure-loop) |
| [Averlon](https://www.averlon.ai/) | Mitigation Agents: Listed on the platform page as a component alongside remediation agents; the pages read give no further description of what they do | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Checked the platform page, the home page and the remediation blog post; none describes customers building or editing their own agents. The blog says the remediation actions are used from the GitHub Marketplace and added to a workflow. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for the Mitigation Agents. The developer review in Averlon's blog belongs to its remediation agents; see the [code and dependency fixes page](/use-cases/code-and-dependency-fixes/). | None found on 19 Nov 2026 on the platform page, home page or remediation blog post for an agent action log. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. | [averlon.ai/platform](https://www.averlon.ai/platform); [averlon.ai](https://www.averlon.ai/); [averlon.ai/blog/automating-remediation-applicatio...](https://www.averlon.ai/blog/automating-remediation-application-infrastructure-security-issues) |
| [Backline](https://backline.ai/) | Andy (Analyst): Interprets vulnerabilities, assesses risk and collects environment context; Polly (Planner): Plans remediation by risk, SLA and environment context; Vera (Verifier): Tests each fix for safety and regressions | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Checked the home page, product page and owner-routing blog post. The blog says security teams set priorities, outreach limits, quiet hours and ownership policies, which tunes behavior but is not building agents. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for Andy, Polly or Vera. The review and approval of proposed fixes on the product page belongs to Backline's coding agent; see the [code and dependency fixes page](/use-cases/code-and-dependency-fixes/). | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for a log or trail of Andy, Polly or Vera's actions. The product FAQ says fixes are standard pull requests, so Git history and rollback apply; that is not counted. | Where no safe upgrade path exists, the platform hands the issue to engineers with an explanation instead of fixing it (vendor statement). | [backline.ai](https://backline.ai/); [backline.ai/product](https://backline.ai/product/); [backline.ai/blog/finding-and-chasing-the-owner-of...](https://backline.ai/blog/finding-and-chasing-the-owner-of-a-fix-in-jira-teams-or-slack/) |
| [Checkmarx](https://checkmarx.com/) | Triage Assist: Separates exploitable risk from severity noise using reachability | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Checked the Assist agent family press release and the Checkmarx One Assist product page; neither addresses customer-built agents or instructions. The product page only says the Assist agents run in a guardrail-enforced environment. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for Triage Assist. The developer review of each fix belongs to Checkmarx's remediation agent; see the [code and dependency fixes page](/use-cases/code-and-dependency-fixes/). | Described. Vendor says AppSec keeps full traceability over automated decisions; the pages read do not show the log itself. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for customer-built agents, or for how the Assist agents decide a fix is safe, on the two pages read. | [checkmarx.com/press-releases/checkmarx-unveils-se...](https://checkmarx.com/press-releases/checkmarx-unveils-self-healing-application-security-in-assist-agent-family/); [checkmarx.com/product/checkmarx-one-assist](https://checkmarx.com/product/checkmarx-one-assist/) |
| [Cogent Security](https://www.cogent.com/) | Cogent AI agents (vulnerability lifecycle): Unnamed agents handle normalization, enrichment, risk assessment and remediation planning, then run fixes inside customer policy | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Checked the home page, AI engine, autonomy levels, Cyber Defense Factory and integrations pages. Customers configure approval gates, thresholds and policy limits but no page describes building custom agents. | Described. Customers choose where agents act alone and where they pause for sign-off, by action type, severity or asset sensitivity; high-impact changes need human approval. | Described. Pages say every agent action is logged with its reasoning and links to the recommendation behind it. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for code pull request generation. | [cogent.com/ai/cogent-ai-engine](https://www.cogent.com/ai/cogent-ai-engine); [cogent.com](https://www.cogent.com/); [cogent.com/ai/autonomy-levels](https://www.cogent.com/ai/autonomy-levels); [cogent.com/platform/cyber-defense-factory](https://www.cogent.com/platform/cyber-defense-factory) |
| [Corridor](https://corridor.dev/) | Corridor Agent: Works through an existing vulnerability backlog, reviews findings and creates guardrails so the same issues do not return | Yes. Teams write security standards in plain English and Corridor turns them into guardrails that apply in agent sessions and on pull requests. Authoring new agents: none found. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Sample text on the page shows fixes opened as pull requests; no review or approval step is stated. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. The audit trail text on the page is about AI coding agents' activity; none found on 19 Nov 2026 tied to the backlog agent's decisions. | The backlog agent is described only in marketing copy and sample text on pages read; none found on 19 Nov 2026 for a docs page with its approval or logging details. | [corridor.dev](https://corridor.dev/) |
| [CrowdStrike](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/exposure-management/) | Exposure Prioritization Agent (Charlotte AI, Falcon Exposure Management): Orders vulnerabilities by likelihood of exploitation using exploitability, adversary intelligence, attack path and asset context. | Yes. Charlotte AI AgentWorks lets teams build custom agents without code, with instructions, tools and activation conditions set by the team. | Described. CrowdStrike says automated actions are configured by the team and can require human approval. | Described. CrowdStrike lists execution traces and audit logs among governance controls for AgentWorks agents. | CrowdStrike states Charlotte AI takes no automated response actions by default; teams configure which are automated. Details of what the Exposure Prioritization Agent itself changes or opens (tickets, fixes): none found on 19 Nov 2026 on the pages checked. | [crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/exposure-management](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/exposure-management/); [crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/charlotte-ai](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/charlotte-ai/) |
| [Cycode](https://cycode.com/) | Exploitability Agent (SAST and SCA): Analyzes SAST and SCA violations to separate theoretical vulnerabilities from exploitable ones, using code-to-runtime context | Yes. Customers set triggers, filters and agent actions in Agentic Workflows and chain agents. Authoring new agents: none found on the pages read. | Described. Customers set which actions require review and which run autonomously, with a confidence threshold on every agent; in the exception-review template a person gives final approval or denial. | Described. Every run records what triggered it, what each agent did and which boundary applied. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for stated limits on the workflow page; the exploitability agent post is dated 27 Aug 2025 and the AI teammates post 22 Oct 2025. | [cycode.com/blog/the-future-of-agentic-ai-appsec-i...](https://cycode.com/blog/the-future-of-agentic-ai-appsec-introducing-ai-teammates/); [cycode.com/agentic-workflows](https://cycode.com/agentic-workflows/) |
| [Dux Security](https://dux.io/) | Dux AI agents: Unnamed agents do exploitability analysis, suggest lightweight mitigations and tag assets to speed owner-led remediation | None found on 19 Nov 2026. The site is a single page (its sitemap lists only the home page), and it does not describe building agents. The page poses 'How can I customize this?' as a question without an answer. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 on the home page. It says mitigations are ones customers deploy themselves. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 on the home page; the sitemap lists no other pages. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for: generated pull requests, named integrations, named customers, pricing or approval controls; remediation is described as asset tagging that speeds owners. | [dux.io](https://dux.io/); [dux.io/sitemap.xml](https://dux.io/sitemap.xml) |
| [Endor Labs](https://www.endorlabs.com/) | AI SAST Remediation (AURI Agent): Reads a case file for each AI SAST finding against the source, decides what is real, then writes the fix or files an exception | Yes. Agents are published as open markdown files that can be read and forked; the Agents Hub itself does not yet add custom agents, but points to an open source route. | Described. The remediation page says approval can be required before any file edit, branch push or pull request; the workflows page says agents are read-only by default with approval gates. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. The Agents Hub usage view is stated to be metering, not a compliance audit log. A docs summary line says agent actions are attributed to a person; the page read does not show that record. | You can view the agents in the Agents Hub but cannot yet add a custom agent inside Endor Labs. | [endorlabs.com/platform/agentic-workflows](https://www.endorlabs.com/platform/agentic-workflows); [endorlabs.com/solutions/agentic-remediation](https://www.endorlabs.com/solutions/agentic-remediation); [docs.endorlabs.com/secure-ai-coding/agents-hub](https://docs.endorlabs.com/secure-ai-coding/agents-hub) |
| [GitHub](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security) | Assign security campaign alerts to Copilot: From a security campaign, 1 to 25 code scanning alerts can be assigned to Copilot in one session producing one pull request | Yes. Copilot uses the custom instructions that apply when generating a fix, and admins at enterprise, organization and repository level control whether autofix is on. Building a wholly new agent was not the topic of these pages. | Described. Agentic autofix output is a draft pull request, and the user who assigns the alerts is added as a requested reviewer. GitHub tells users to review and test before merging. | Described. When an alert is assigned to an agent, a session is created, and the agent's log can be reviewed from the alert timeline. | GitHub states agentic autofix validates by re-running CodeQL and cannot confirm fixes for some alert types. | [docs.github.com/en/code-security/how-tos/manage-s...](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/how-tos/manage-security-alerts/remediate-alerts-at-scale/fixing-alerts-in-security-campaign); [docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/code-sc...](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/code-scanning/autofix-for-code-scanning); [docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/depen...](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-alerts/about-dependabot-alerts) |
| [Maze](https://mazehq.com/) | Maze remediation agents: Find root cause, validate a fix and route it to the responsible developer or coding agent | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Checked the home, cloud, code and remediation pages; none describes customer-built agents. | Described. Remediation page says developers review and merge fixes like any PR, and the team controls what gets merged. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for an agent action log. Pages say each fix and recommendation carries its evidence and reasoning. | Where no fix exists, agents recommend a mitigation instead (vendor statement). | [mazehq.com/solutions/remediation](https://mazehq.com/solutions/remediation); [mazehq.com](https://mazehq.com/); [mazehq.com/platform/cloud](https://mazehq.com/platform/cloud); [mazehq.com/platform/code](https://mazehq.com/platform/code) |
| [Microsoft](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security-copilot/agents-overview) | Vulnerability Remediation Agent (Security Copilot in Intune, public preview): Reads Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management data, orders CVEs on managed Windows devices and apps, and gives step-by-step Intune guidance that an admin carries out | Yes. Microsoft documents a build, test and publish path for custom Security Copilot agents. Whether the Vulnerability Remediation Agent itself can be edited was not stated on the pages checked. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for an agent-side gate. An administrator carries out the suggested steps in Intune and marks them applied; the Device Offboarding Agent requires admin approval, but it is a different agent. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for an audit log specific to the vulnerability agent. After a person remediates a suggestion they can mark it applied, which gives the agent a record of past fixes across runs. Microsoft Entra agent pages separately describe activity history for Entra agents. | Public cloud only, and Windows devices and apps managed in Intune only (Microsoft scope statement). The agent is in public preview. | [learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/agents/vulnerabi...](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/agents/vulnerability-remediation-agent); [learn.microsoft.com/en-us/copilot/security/develo...](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/copilot/security/developer/custom-agent-overview); [learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/agents](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/agents/) |
| [Onit Security](https://onit.security/) | Exploitability Agent: Checks host conditions to judge whether a finding can be exploited in the customer's environment; Ownership Agent: Resolves the real owner from inventories, ticketing history, directories and repositories; Remediation Agent: Builds a step-by-step remediation plan; the pages describe a plan, not an opened pull request; Mitigation Agent: Finds interim mitigations such as disabling a feature or tightening a firewall rule | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Checked the platform page, home page and both blog posts. A team can adjust one agent's behavior and calibrate behavior through decisions, but no page describes building new agents. | Described. Platform page says every agent action passes an approval gate; the Zero-Day post says a person approves the decision before disruptive action. | Described. Same platform page sentence says actions write to an audit trail; the AI agents post says conclusions trace back to the producing agent and evidence. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 on the pages read for: customer-built agents or an opened pull request; the Zero-Day post (dated 23 Oct 2026) said its full launch was the following week. | [onit.security/blog/ai-agents-vulnerability-manage...](https://onit.security/blog/ai-agents-vulnerability-management/); [onit.security/platform](https://onit.security/platform/); [onit.security](https://onit.security/); [onit.security/blog/zero-day-response](https://onit.security/blog/zero-day-response/) |
| [Pixee](https://www.pixee.ai/) | Pixee triage engine (AI agents tier): Sends each finding through deterministic checks first, then AI agents that investigate the codebase for ambiguous cases, and records a justification | Yes. Per-repository PIXEE.yaml, AI settings, and bring-your-own-model options let a team set what Pixee addresses and how PRs look. Authoring new agents: none found on the pages read. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for the triage engine. The pull request review that fixes go through belongs to Pixee's fix generation; see the [code and dependency fixes page](/use-cases/code-and-dependency-fixes/). | Described. Each triage decision is stored with a timestamp, outcome and the model's justification; each fix is a traceable pull request. | Fixes are narrow: 1 to 5 line security changes, not general code generation (vendor description). | [docs.pixee.ai/faq/general](https://docs.pixee.ai/faq/general); [docs.pixee.ai/configuration/pixee-yaml](https://docs.pixee.ai/configuration/pixee-yaml); [docs.pixee.ai/enterprise/compliance](https://docs.pixee.ai/enterprise/compliance) |
| [ProjectDiscovery](https://projectdiscovery.io/) | Vuln Triage Agent (Neo): Reviews and tests incoming reports, advisories and scanner output to judge exploitability and severity before anyone acts on them; Verification Agent (Neo): Independently re-tests findings after a testing run and files only the confirmed ones | Yes. Neo documents custom agents that a team defines for its own workflow, tools and expected output, and a way to share them across a team. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 on the Vuln Triage Agent page or the agent architecture page for a human approval step before an agent acts. Neo creates issues and retests when fixes ship, and the GitHub app does not need write access to code. | Described. The homepage says every agent action is logged and can be queried and exported to a SIEM. | Neo's GitHub integration does not need write access to code, and none found on 19 Nov 2026 for an agent that authors code or dependency fix pull requests on the pages read. | [docs.neo.projectdiscovery.io/platform/agents/anal...](https://docs.neo.projectdiscovery.io/platform/agents/analysis/vuln-triage-agent); [docs.neo.projectdiscovery.io/platform/agents/anal...](https://docs.neo.projectdiscovery.io/platform/agents/analysis/verification-agent); [docs.neo.projectdiscovery.io/platform/agents/cust...](https://docs.neo.projectdiscovery.io/platform/agents/custom-agents); [docs.neo.projectdiscovery.io/concepts/agent-archi...](https://docs.neo.projectdiscovery.io/concepts/agent-architecture) |
| [Qualys](https://www.qualys.com/) | Agent Val: Decides what to validate next, safely tests whether an exposure is reachable and weaponizable, then triggers mitigations and re-checks; Agent Sara: Runs remediation in waves gated by a patch reliability score, with patchless options, rollback and closure verification | None found on 19 Nov 2026. No customer-authored agent feature appeared on the three Qualys pages read. Customers do set the policies, maintenance windows and ring conditions Agent Sara works within. | Described. Patches likely to succeed deploy with zero-touch automation, less certain ones go through ring-based validation, and the ServiceNow change integration keeps every change under existing approval processes. | Described. Agent Val is described as keeping an audit trail when it re-checks exploit validation after mitigation. | Agent Grant (identity attack surface) is labeled coming soon; none found on 19 Nov 2026: customer-built agents on the pages read. | [qualys.com/apps/agentic-ai](https://www.qualys.com/apps/agentic-ai); [qualys.com/apps/trurisk-eliminate](https://www.qualys.com/apps/trurisk-eliminate/); [qualys.com/apps/enterprise-trurisk-management](https://www.qualys.com/apps/enterprise-trurisk-management) |
| [Rival Security](https://rival.security/?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide) | Triage findings: Built-in agent that cuts scanner output down to the findings judged exploitable | Yes. The home page offers three routes: ready-made agents that can be customized and extended, agents custom built by Rival engineers, or building your own. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for the triage agent. The pull request review that the home page describes ("so your team reviews instead of digging") belongs to Rival's fix agent; see the [code and dependency fixes page](/use-cases/code-and-dependency-fixes/). | Described. The home page states every agent action is traced, auditable and held to the customer's policies. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for pricing or named customers on the pages read. | [rival.security](https://rival.security/?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide); [rival.security/use-cases](https://rival.security/use-cases?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide) |
| [Seemplicity](https://seemplicity.ai/) | Host VM Analyst: Checks exploit prerequisites against live host settings and lowers priority when a condition is missing | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Neither the home page nor the AI Analysts article nor the agentic workforce page mentions customer-built agents. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 on the three pages read for an approval gate on the analysts; the home page says analysts hand back decision, evidence, fix options and an owner. | Described. The article says each finding carries a record of how the decision was reached. | None found on 19 Nov 2026: approval gates, customer-built agents, or a date on the home page for the analyst list. | [seemplicity.ai](https://seemplicity.ai/); [seemplicity.ai/news/ai-analysts-autonomous-vulner...](https://seemplicity.ai/news/ai-analysts-autonomous-vulnerability-response/); [seemplicity.ai/platform/agentic-workforce](https://seemplicity.ai/platform/agentic-workforce/) |
| [Semgrep](https://semgrep.dev/) | Semgrep Multimodal (formerly Semgrep Assistant): Auto-analyzes Semgrep Code findings and recommends which can safely be ignored, with an explanation for each recommendation. The docs call it AI-driven, not an agent; Semgrep Agentic Workflows (review step): A workflow step that reviews potential vulnerabilities in context for validity and priority and captures feedback | Yes. Agentic Workflows can be extended with an SDK, and Multimodal accepts per-project, per-rule Memories and custom instructions. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for Multimodal or the review step; its ignore suggestions are recommendations. The draft pull request that leaves review and merge to the team belongs to Semgrep's autofix; see the [code and dependency fixes page](/use-cases/code-and-dependency-fixes/). | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for a log of triage decisions. The vendor calls custom workflows "auditable"; that is not counted. | Multimodal mainly supports findings from Semgrep Code and needs the Semgrep AppSec Platform. | [docs.semgrep.dev/semgrep-multimodal/overview](https://docs.semgrep.dev/semgrep-multimodal/overview.md); [semgrep.dev/products/semgrep-agentic-workflows](https://semgrep.dev/products/semgrep-agentic-workflows/); [docs.semgrep.dev/semgrep-code/triage-remediation/...](https://docs.semgrep.dev/semgrep-code/triage-remediation/autofix.md) |
| [Snyk](https://snyk.io/) | Evo Remediation Agent: Runs a scan, fix and validate loop in a sandbox on new code and on the existing backlog, with people owning the merge decision | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Pages read describe fixed agents with a stated role each; none found for customers building their own agents or editing agent behavior. Checked the Evo Agentic AppSec page, the launch announcement and Snyk's llms.txt index. | Described. Remediation is gated: a fix that might break the build is queued for approval instead of merging. Prevention inside a coding agent is stated to need no human sign-off. | Described. Vendor says every agent decision lands in an audit trail; the pages read do not show what the trail contains or how to export it. | Availability is limited: three of the agents are in experimental preview for select customers and the Remediation Agent is in open preview. | [snyk.io/evo/agentic-appsec](https://snyk.io/evo/agentic-appsec/); [snyk.io/news/snyk-launches-evo-agentic-appsec](https://snyk.io/news/snyk-launches-evo-agentic-appsec/); [snyk.io/llms.txt](https://snyk.io/llms.txt) |
| [Tenable](https://www.tenable.com/) | Tenable Hexa AI: An orchestrator over a fleet of agents that triages vulnerabilities on a schedule, creates tickets, connects to patch tools and triggers rescans when tickets close | Yes. Customers can connect their own LLMs through the Hexa AI MCP server and design custom workflows. | Described. The data sheet says approvals by a human are built in; Patch Management also has policy controls for approvals. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for agent actions on the Hexa AI page, data sheet or Patch Management page. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for stated limits of Hexa AI on the pages read. | [tenable.com/products/tenable-one/capabilities/hex...](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-one/capabilities/hexa-ai); [tenable.com/data-sheets/tenable-hexa-ai-the-agent...](https://www.tenable.com/data-sheets/tenable-hexa-ai-the-agentic-engine-for-tenable-one-exposure-management); [tenable.com/products/patch-management](https://www.tenable.com/products/patch-management) |
| [Torq](https://torq.io/blog/vulnerability-management-lifecycle/) | Torq agentic AI in vulnerability management (HyperAgents): Torq's blog describes agentic AI that adjusts prioritization from live threat intelligence, reassigns work on delays, and coordinates patch, ticket and verification steps through connected tools. The blog does not name a specific vulnerability agent | Yes. Torq offers agent templates and a builder for custom HyperAgents; vulnerability workflows are no-code. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for vulnerability remediation actions. The builder deploys nothing until a person approves it; that gate is on publishing an agent, not on its actions. | Described. Torq says each reasoning step, decision and action of a HyperAgent is logged. | Torq frames its agents mainly around the SOC. A named vulnerability agent: none found on 19 Nov 2026; the blog describes agentic AI in vulnerability management without naming one. | [torq.io/blog/vulnerability-management-lifecycle](https://torq.io/blog/vulnerability-management-lifecycle/); [torq.io/hyperagents](https://torq.io/hyperagents/) |
| [Vicarius](https://www.vicarius.io/) | Agentic Exploit Simulation (vIntelligence): Tests each vulnerability in the live environment to confirm an attacker can exploit it before it reaches the team | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for Agentic Exploit Simulation. Plain-language script requests belong to ScriptAI, which is covered on the [new disclosure page](/use-cases/new-disclosure-response/). | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for Agentic Exploit Simulation. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for a log of its decisions. The page says vScore re-validates every asset automatically after fixes. | Vendor states Agentic Exposure Validation cuts 95% of false positives before they reach the team; the page gives no method (vendor claim). | [vicarius.io/features/vrx-analysis](https://www.vicarius.io/features/vrx-analysis); [vicarius.io/features/scriptai](https://www.vicarius.io/features/scriptai) |
| [Wiz](https://www.wiz.io/blog/introducing-wiz-agents) | Green Agent: Investigates high-risk Issues in Wiz, finds root cause and owner, gives a Remediate or Ignore decision with confidence, and produces fix steps, pull requests or hand-offs to coding agents | Yes. Wiz Workflows let a team define when agents act and where a person must approve. Building a new agent from scratch was not described on the pages checked. | Described. Lower-confidence Green Agent decisions can be routed to a developer in Slack for approval before remediation. | Described. The investigation steps are laid out in an Investigation tab so teams can see how a recommendation was derived. | Wiz's Red Agent (offensive testing) and Blue Agent (threat investigation) fall outside the six jobs; a Wiz agent for new-disclosure response, threat modeling or access reviews: none found on 19 Nov 2026 on the two blog pages checked. | [wiz.io/blog/introducing-wiz-green-agent](https://www.wiz.io/blog/introducing-wiz-green-agent); [wiz.io/blog/introducing-wiz-agents](https://www.wiz.io/blog/introducing-wiz-agents) |
| [Zafran](https://www.zafran.io/) | Agentic Remediation: Agents research CVE conditions, validate exploitability on live assets, and generate remediation scripts by simulating patch impact, with human oversight | Yes. A customer testimonial on the home page says users can create their own agent, and the product mock shows a prompt to create a scheduled report agent. Scope not documented on the pages read. | Described. Vendor says approval workflows apply at every step of Agentic Remediation. | Described. Same sentence claims full command auditability. | None found on 19 Nov 2026: pull requests as a remediation output on the home and platform pages; work is routed as tickets. | [zafran.io/platform](https://www.zafran.io/platform); [zafran.io](https://www.zafran.io/) |

For the surrounding jobs see [response to a new disclosure](/use-cases/new-disclosure-response/) and [code and dependency fixes](/use-cases/code-and-dependency-fixes/). The questions to settle before an agent changes production are in the [human approval points](/evaluation-checklist/human-approval-points/) and [evidence and audit trail](/evaluation-checklist/evidence-and-audit-trail/) checklist pages.

## Sources

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- [Tenable, tenable.com/products/tenable-one/capabilities/hex...](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-one/capabilities/hexa-ai), read 19 Nov 2026
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- [Tenable, tenable.com/products/patch-management](https://www.tenable.com/products/patch-management), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Torq, torq.io/blog/vulnerability-management-lifecycle](https://torq.io/blog/vulnerability-management-lifecycle/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Torq, torq.io/hyperagents](https://torq.io/hyperagents/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Vicarius, vicarius.io/features/vrx-analysis](https://www.vicarius.io/features/vrx-analysis), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Vicarius, vicarius.io/features/scriptai](https://www.vicarius.io/features/scriptai), read 19 Nov 2026
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- [Zafran, zafran.io/platform](https://www.zafran.io/platform), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Zafran, zafran.io](https://www.zafran.io/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [docs.jfrog.com/administration/reference/getartifa...](https://docs.jfrog.com/administration/reference/getartifactoryversion), read 19 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

Canonical: https://agenticaiincybersecurity.com/use-cases/vulnerability-triage-and-remediation/
