# AI Threat Modeling Agents: 6 Vendors and What to Keep

As of 19 Nov 2026, 6 vendors publish an agent that drafts a threat model or design security review: IriusRisk, Pixee, Rival Security, Seezo, Snyk and ThreatModeler. IriusRisk states that its AI step does not assess response quality.

## Counts from the vendors directory

- 2 of 6 vendors let customers build or change the agent.
- 3 of 6 vendors describe an approval step.
- 5 of 6 vendors describe an audit trail.

Vendors: IriusRisk, Pixee, Rival Security, Seezo, Snyk, ThreatModeler.

## What the agents read and produce

A threat modeling agent writes a document, not a change.

The vendors differ in what they take in and in what they hand back. Seezo "understands any design-level input and delivers a complete security design review and threat model in minutes" ([Seezo](https://www.seezo.io/)); Snyk's Evo Agentic Security Review starts from a repository ("it builds an application and threat model", [Snyk Evo](https://snyk.io/evo/agentic-appsec/)); IriusRisk's Jeff takes "text prompts or images" and leaves threats and countermeasures to its rules engine ([IriusRisk](https://www.iriusrisk.com/ai-threat-modeling)). On output, Seezo returns a design review and threat model in which every threat and requirement cites its source artifact and standard. Snyk reports evidence-backed findings, IriusRisk a threat model diagram that the user reviews and edits inside its tool, ThreatModeler a threat model with an auditable record of decisions, Pixee findings tied to a spec line and a threat, and Rival a map of a repository's attack surface. None of the pages read describes an export format for the model (none found on 19 Nov 2026), so ask for one. Each vendor's agent is in the table below.

## Where a person approves

Nothing in production changes when a model is drafted, but later design decisions rely on it, so approval here means accepting the model. The wording from ThreatModeler, IriusRisk and Pixee is in the table below.

Seezo's threat modeling page lists a triage step but no sign-off workflow. Snyk's gate (a fix queued for approval) belongs to its Remediation Agent, not to Evo Agentic Security Review. For Rival's threat model agent its pages describe no approval step (none found on 19 Nov 2026); the pull request review it describes belongs to its fix agents. Under the matrix rule these three are not counted.

MITRE ATLAS says who should finish the job: "Separate tools, such as dedicated audit agents, may assist human approval, but final adjudication should be conducted by a human decision-maker" ([MITRE ATLAS data release 5.6.0](https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml), mitigation AML.M0029).

## Vendors that publish an agent for this job

Alphabetical, the same fields for every vendor, read 19 Nov 2026. Quotes and claims are the vendor's. Snyk appears for its repository-level review. Pixee appears for Foresight, which its page calls a system, not an agent: it reads specs, ties each finding to a spec line and a threat, and checks shipped code against the design promises, which is the work of drafting and reviewing a design-level threat model. Its approval and evidence are counted for Foresight alone. Both vendors also appear on the [vulnerability triage page](/use-cases/vulnerability-triage-and-remediation/). Every vendor's agents across all six jobs are listed in the use-case matrix.

6 vendors with a published agent for threat modeling, alphabetical, read 19 Nov 2026.

| Vendor | Agents named for this job | Customer can build or change agents | Approval step | Evidence left | Stated limit | Sources (read 19 Nov 2026) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [IriusRisk](https://www.iriusrisk.com/) | Jeff (AI threat modeling assistant): Turns text prompts or images into a threat model diagram inside IriusRisk, which the user then reviews and edits; MCP-connected AI agents: External AI agents can be connected to IriusRisk's threat modeling process for modeling and analysis | No. The page does not say customers can bring their own agents. Jeff runs on the vendor's OpenAI Enterprise setup and the vendor says it cannot switch to a customer's Azure OpenAI instance. Custom IriusRisk components are recognized if named and described well. | Described. The user reviews and can edit the generated diagram before it proceeds. The vendor writes: "Jeff does not assess the quality of the response; this is the responsibility of the human in the loop." | Described. Threats and countermeasures come from the rules engine rather than the AI, and the page says this carries traceability and audit logs. | The AI step does not check response quality, so a person must judge it (vendor statement). | [iriusrisk.com/ai-threat-modeling](https://www.iriusrisk.com/ai-threat-modeling); [iriusrisk.com](https://www.iriusrisk.com/) |
| [Pixee](https://www.pixee.ai/) | Foresight (design-stage review): Reads specs, ties findings to a spec line and a threat, and checks shipped code against the design promises. The page presents it as a system, not by the word agent | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for Foresight. The per-repository PIXEE.yaml settings and bring-your-own-model options described in the docs apply to Pixee's triage and fix engine (see the [vulnerability page](/use-cases/vulnerability-triage-and-remediation/)). | Described. "Every finding ties to a spec line you confirm or dismiss in one click." | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for Foresight. Triage decisions in Pixee's other engine are stored with a timestamp, outcome and justification. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for stated limits of Foresight; the page presents it as a system, not by the word agent. | [pixee.ai/foresight](https://www.pixee.ai/foresight); [docs.pixee.ai/configuration/pixee-yaml](https://docs.pixee.ai/configuration/pixee-yaml); [docs.pixee.ai/faq/general](https://docs.pixee.ai/faq/general); [docs.pixee.ai/enterprise/compliance](https://docs.pixee.ai/enterprise/compliance) |
| [Rival Security](https://rival.security/?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide) | Threat model: Built-in agent that maps the attack surface of a repository | Yes. The home page offers three routes: ready-made agents that can be customized and extended, agents custom built by Rival engineers, or building your own. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for the threat model agent; the pull request review described for Rival's fix agents does not apply to it. The home page says every agent action is "traced, auditable and held to your policies". | Described. The home page states each agent action is traced and auditable and held to the customer's policies. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for pricing or named customers on the pages read. | [rival.security](https://rival.security/?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide); [rival.security/use-cases](https://rival.security/use-cases?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide) |
| [Seezo](https://www.seezo.io/) | Seezo Agent and Seezo AI Plugin: Builds a design-level security review and threat model from design artifacts, and works inside coding tools through a plugin | Yes. Organizations can feed in their own standards, approved patterns and custom requirements and set their own rules and remediation guidance. This is configuration, not building a new agent. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. The threat modeling page lists a triage step but describes no approval or sign-off workflow; the plugin page says drift between requirements and what was built is reported. | Described. "Every threat and requirement carries its rationale and citations back to the source artifact and the standard behind it." Security teams see which skills fired and when. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for a described human approval step on the threat modeling page. | [seezo.io](https://www.seezo.io/); [seezo.io/threat-modeling](https://www.seezo.io/threat-modeling); [seezo.io/seezo-ai-plugin](https://www.seezo.io/seezo-ai-plugin) |
| [Snyk](https://snyk.io/) | Evo Agentic Security Review: Reviews a repository, builds an application model and a threat model from code and context, and reports evidence-backed findings | None found on 19 Nov 2026. The pages read describe fixed agents with a stated role each; none describes customers building agents or editing agent behavior. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for Evo Agentic Security Review itself. The gate Snyk describes, a fix that might break the build queued for approval, belongs to the Remediation Agent (see the [vulnerability page](/use-cases/vulnerability-triage-and-remediation/)). | Described. Snyk writes that "every agent decision is captured in an audit trail." The pages read do not show what the trail contains or how to export it. | Evo Agentic Security Review is available "to select Snyk customers in experimental preview" (Snyk launch post). | [snyk.io/evo/agentic-appsec](https://snyk.io/evo/agentic-appsec/); [snyk.io/news/snyk-launches-evo-agentic-appsec](https://snyk.io/news/snyk-launches-evo-agentic-appsec/); [snyk.io/llms.txt](https://snyk.io/llms.txt) |
| [ThreatModeler](https://www.threatmodeler.ai/) | NexusAI: Creates threat models from descriptions or existing materials, finds risks and proposes updates as architecture changes; System Mapping Agent, Graph Agent, Reporting Agent: Three further agents are named on the homepage; the homepage gives no description of what each does | None found on 19 Nov 2026. No statement that customers can build their own agents. NexusAI draws on the organization's own architecture and security decisions held in the Secure Design Graph. | Described. "Your team reviews and approves changes before they're applied, with an auditable record of decisions." | Described. An auditable record of decisions is stated. | None found on 19 Nov 2026: the NexusAI page states no limits or exclusions, and the three other named agents have no description on the home page. | [threatmodeler.ai](https://www.threatmodeler.ai/); [threatmodeler.ai/platform/nexusai](https://www.threatmodeler.ai/platform/nexusai) |

Before an agent drafts models your designers rely on, settle the questions on [human approval points](/evaluation-checklist/human-approval-points/) and [evidence and audit trail](/evaluation-checklist/evidence-and-audit-trail/), and see the whole use-case map.

## Evidence to keep

A model whose threats trace to a rule or a standard can be audited by checking the rule. One drafted freely by an agent can only be audited by comparing it with a person's work, which is why the record below marks each threat's source. What each vendor says it keeps is in the table.

Threat model acceptance record

- System or change modeled, and the design artifacts the agent read (versions and dates)
- Agent, version and model used
- For each threat: source rule or standard, or "agent-drafted, no source"
- Threats the reviewer added, removed or changed
- Reviewer name, role and date
- Open items accepted without mitigation, and who owns them
- Date the model must be re-checked, or the design change that triggers it

## The risk, in OWASP's words

The approver of a fluent, complete model is the person most exposed to the risk OWASP describes under misinformation: "Overreliance occurs when users place excessive trust in LLM-generated content, failing to verify its accuracy. This overreliance exacerbates the impact of misinformation, as users may integrate incorrect data into critical decisions or processes without adequate scrutiny." ([OWASP LLM09:2025](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm092025-misinformation/)). For a threat model, the "critical decisions" are the design choices later built on a missing threat.

## Worked example: two design choices behind CVE-2026-9198

CVE-2026-9198 is a Langflow OSS flaw (versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.0, CVSS 3.1 base score 9.8 from the CNA). IBM's bulletin says it chains two issues: "an unauthenticated endpoint that issued superuser bearer tokens to any network caller", and a code validation endpoint that "executed Python decorators, default arguments, and annotations at function definition time". It affected default deployments where auto-login was enabled ([IBM bulletin](https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7278927)). Both are choices visible in a design document, months before a scanner could find anything.

Dates from the vendor release and bulletin and the NVD and CISA records, read 19 Nov 2026. From the fix release to the KEV listing is 42 days.

| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 23 Jun 2026 | Langflow 1.10.1 released, with the superuser token change | [Langflow release notes](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/v1.10.1) |
| 2 Jul 2026 | IBM publishes the security bulletin | [IBM](https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7278927) |
| 17 Jul 2026 | Published in the NVD | [NVD](https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-9198) |
| 4 Aug 2026 | Added to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog; the due date was 7 Aug 2026 | [CISA KEV](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-9198) |

The test uses a design, not a scanner. Write a one-page design for an agent-builder web app that has a convenience login mode and an endpoint that checks user-submitted code, without naming either as a risk. Model it by hand first. The hand model should hold three entries: T1, a default login mode that issues administrator tokens to any caller on the network; T2, an endpoint that executes submitted code while checking it; and T3, the chain of T1 and T2, which is remote code execution with no login. Then give the same page to the agent and check whether it lists T1 and T2 separately and then the chain, whether each entry cites a source rule or a standard, and whether its mitigations match the vendor's. IBM lists no workaround and says to upgrade to 1.10.1; Langflow's documentation says to "Set LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=False, use a non-default LANGFLOW_SECRET_KEY, and deploy your Langflow server behind a reverse proxy with authentication enabled", and warns that "Automatic login lets anyone who can reach the server act as the superuser" ([IBM](https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7278927), [Langflow authentication docs](https://docs.langflow.org/api-keys-and-authentication)). The CVE record is the answer key, so the design must not carry hints. This is a test to run on the agent you are evaluating; no result from running it is reported here, and the pass mark is all three entries found with a source for each.

Filled in for T1, the acceptance record reads: source "agent-drafted, no source" until the reviewer attaches the IBM bulletin of 2 Jul 2026; mitigation "auto-login off, authenticating reverse proxy in front"; open item "superuser tokens issued before the fix lasted 365 days, so rotate them" (the 1.10.1 release notes name a 365-day superuser token); re-check trigger "any change to the default authentication mode". Change the design and run it again: the agent should drop T1 from the list when auto-login is removed from the design and stay silent on T2 if the endpoint is unchanged. ThreatModeler's home page says its platform flags architecture changes and proposes updates, which is the behavior to check.

## Sources

- [OWASP GenAI Security Project, LLM09:2025 Misinformation](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm092025-misinformation/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [MITRE ATLAS data release 5.6.0, mitigation AML.M0029](https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml), read 19 Nov 2026
- [IBM security bulletin, Langflow OSS CVE-2026-9198](https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7278927), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Langflow 1.10.1 release notes](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/v1.10.1), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Langflow documentation, API keys and authentication](https://docs.langflow.org/api-keys-and-authentication), read 19 Nov 2026
- [NVD record, CVE-2026-9198](https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-9198), read 19 Nov 2026
- [CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, CVE-2026-9198](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-9198), read 19 Nov 2026
- [IriusRisk, iriusrisk.com/ai-threat-modeling](https://www.iriusrisk.com/ai-threat-modeling), read 19 Nov 2026
- [IriusRisk, iriusrisk.com](https://www.iriusrisk.com/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [ThreatModeler, threatmodeler.ai/platform/nexusai](https://www.threatmodeler.ai/platform/nexusai), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Seezo, seezo.io/threat-modeling](https://www.seezo.io/threat-modeling), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Pixee, pixee.ai/foresight](https://www.pixee.ai/foresight), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Pixee, docs.pixee.ai/configuration/pixee-yaml](https://docs.pixee.ai/configuration/pixee-yaml), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Pixee, docs.pixee.ai/faq/general](https://docs.pixee.ai/faq/general), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Pixee, docs.pixee.ai/enterprise/compliance](https://docs.pixee.ai/enterprise/compliance), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Rival Security, rival.security](https://rival.security/?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Rival Security, rival.security/use-cases](https://rival.security/use-cases?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Seezo, seezo.io](https://www.seezo.io/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Seezo, seezo.io/seezo-ai-plugin](https://www.seezo.io/seezo-ai-plugin), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Snyk, snyk.io/evo/agentic-appsec](https://snyk.io/evo/agentic-appsec/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Snyk, snyk.io/news/snyk-launches-evo-agentic-appsec](https://snyk.io/news/snyk-launches-evo-agentic-appsec/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Snyk, snyk.io/llms.txt](https://snyk.io/llms.txt), read 19 Nov 2026
- [ThreatModeler, threatmodeler.ai](https://www.threatmodeler.ai/), read 19 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

Canonical: https://agenticaiincybersecurity.com/use-cases/threat-modeling/
