# AI Agents for New-Disclosure Response: Approvals and Records

As of 19 Nov 2026, 10 vendors publish an agent that matches a newly disclosed vulnerability to a customer's own assets and proposes next steps. The page shows where a person approves, what record to keep, and a worked example that follows CVE-2026-111497 from the 14 Oct 2026 pre-alert to the 10 Nov CISA due date.

## Counts from the vendors directory

- 4 of 10 vendors let customers build or change the agent.
- 6 of 10 vendors describe an approval step.
- 6 of 10 vendors describe an audit trail.

Vendors: Astelia, Cogent Security, Endor Labs, Maze, Onit Security, Qualys, Rival Security, Seemplicity, Vicarius, Zafran.

## What the agents do with a new advisory

The input is a new advisory plus the customer's own inventory. Astelia's Hunter agent checks newly disclosed and zero-day vulnerabilities against an SBOM and software list "to find what's reachable, even before scanners detect them" ([Astelia](https://www.astelia.io/use-cases/deploy-astelia-agents)). Seemplicity says its SCA Analyst powers SBOM-driven zero-day response before scanner signatures exist ([Seemplicity](https://seemplicity.ai/news/ai-analysts-autonomous-vulnerability-response/)). Cogent promises vulnerable software identified "within minutes of a new disclosure, before scanners can" ([Cogent](https://www.cogent.com/)). These are vendor statements of speed with no method published on the pages read. The disclosures of the last two months and their CISA due dates are on [dates to know](/dates-to-know/).

Zafran's 88-second figure sits on a home page demonstration built around an OpenSSL pre-announcement of 25 October 2022, so it shows a flow rather than a measured result on a 2026 disclosure ([Zafran](https://www.zafran.io/)). Onit's Zero-Day Agent gives each asset one of three outcomes, "exploitable in your environment, conditions not met, or could not verify", checks read-only through the customer's EDR and "does not run live exploits against production" ([Onit](https://onit.security/blog/zero-day-response/)). Its post is dated 23 Oct 2026 and says the full launch was the following week. Rival's write-up of PHP2Shell reports that for one unnamed customer a triaging agent found 60 repositories containing PHP, 29 of them potentially vulnerable, before scanners could detect the CVEs (vendor-reported, [Rival blog](https://rival.security/blog/php2shell-black-october-2026?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide)).

Vendors with a published agent for this job, alphabetical, the same fields for each vendor, read 19 Nov 2026. Claims are the vendor's own.

| Vendor | Agent named for this job | What the vendor says it does | Customer can build or change agents | Limits stated, or none found |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| [Astelia](https://www.astelia.io/) | The Hunter (Zero-Day Detection) | Vendor claim: workflows are built from plain-language specs with fine-grained tool scopes and human checkpoints, and run over 100+ integrations. | Yes. The launch post says customers describe a workflow in plain language to a planner agent, can create agents from scratch, or adjust templates from a marketplace. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for code pull requests on the pages read: fixes described are patches through patch tools, firewall and IPS rules, and tickets. |
| [Cogent Security](https://www.cogent.com/) | Cogent AI agents (new disclosure) | Vendor claim: autonomy is staged, starting with recommendations plus approval and widening as results hold up, with read-only access by default. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Checked the home page, AI engine, autonomy levels, Cyber Defense Factory and integrations pages. Customers configure approval gates, thresholds and policy limits but no page describes building custom agents. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 on the pages read for: code pull request generation or customer-built agents; the autonomy-levels page shows operations such as patching and IAM token revocation as approval-gated examples. |
| [Endor Labs](https://www.endorlabs.com/) | Malware Responder (AURI Agent) | Vendor claim: correlates live supply-chain malware intelligence against the customer's inventory and returns affected projects, indicators of compromise and containment guidance. It answers a disclosed malicious package rather than a CVE. | Yes. Agents are published as open markdown files that can be read and forked; the Agents Hub itself does not yet add custom agents, but points to an open source route. | You can view the agents in the Agents Hub but cannot yet add a custom agent inside Endor Labs. |
| [Maze](https://mazehq.com/) | Maze Cloud agents | Vendor claim: when a new zero-day drops, agents sweep every instance across the environment in hours, before scanners have a signature ([Maze cloud page](https://mazehq.com/platform/cloud)). | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Checked the home, cloud, code and remediation pages; none describes customer-built agents. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 on the pages read for: customer-built agents or an action log; where no fix exists, agents recommend a mitigation instead (vendor statement). |
| [Onit Security](https://onit.security/) | Zero-Day Agent | Vendor claim: approved decisions become standing rules so matching exposures are handled without repeat review, with each action logged and reversible. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Checked the platform page, home page and both blog posts. A team can adjust one agent's behavior and calibrate behavior through decisions, but no page describes building new agents. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 on the pages read for: customer-built agents or an opened pull request; the Zero-Day post (dated Oct 23, 2026) said its full launch was the following week. |
| [Qualys](https://www.qualys.com/) | Agent Insta; Agent Nyra | Vendor claim: Agent Insta correlates new advisories with live inventory and telemetry; Agent Nyra maps weaponized CVEs to the customer's impacted assets and reorders the backlog. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. No customer-authored agent feature appeared on the three Qualys pages read. Customers do set the policies and maintenance windows that Qualys's patching agent works within. | Agent Grant (identity attack surface) is labeled coming soon; none found on 2026-11-19: customer-built agents on the pages read. |
| [Rival Security](https://rival.security/?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide) | 0-day response | Vendor claim: one harness with built-in, vendor-built and customer-built agents, and a published write-up of agents triaging PHP2Shell exposure across customer repositories before scanners could detect the CVEs. | Yes. The home page offers three routes: use ready-made agents and extend them, have Rival engineers build tailored agents, or build your own. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for: public documentation, pricing, or named customers on the pages read. |
| [Seemplicity](https://seemplicity.ai/) | SCA Analyst | Vendor claim: each analyst returns a decision with its evidence, fix options and a likely owner. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Neither the home page nor the AI Analysts article nor the agentic workforce page mentions customer-built agents. | None found on 2026-11-19: approval gates, customer-built agents, or a date on the home page for the analyst list. |
| [Vicarius](https://www.vicarius.io/) | ScriptAI | Vendor claim: AI scripts are held as drafts until a human reviews and publishes them. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for building or changing agents. Any team member can describe a scripting need in plain language and ScriptAI generates a script for the private library; that is script authoring. | Vendor states a 95% false-positive cut with no method on the page; none found on 19 Nov 2026: a log of ScriptAI's own generation decisions (the page says script executions inherit operator logging and timestamped results). |
| [Zafran](https://www.zafran.io/) | Zero Day Agent | Vendor claim: routes remediation work to owners through existing ticketing and consolidates overlapping tasks. | Yes. A customer testimonial on the home page says users can create their own agent, and the product mock shows a prompt to create a scheduled report agent. Scope not documented on the pages read. | None found on 2026-11-19: pull requests as a remediation output on the home and platform pages; work is routed as tickets. |

## Approval gates under a clock

A disclosure agent works against a deadline, which is when a team is most tempted to let it act. Vicarius holds ScriptAI scripts as drafts until a person publishes them ([Vicarius](https://www.vicarius.io/features/scriptai)). Zafran says approval workflows apply at every step of its remediation, and Astelia's example workflow leaves a drafted ticket and a proposed firewall rule in an approval queue until a person clicks ([Astelia](https://www.astelia.io/post/closing-the-exposure-loop)). Qualys keeps changes under existing process through condition-based patch blocking and a ServiceNow change integration ([Qualys](https://www.qualys.com/apps/trurisk-eliminate/)). Onit's post says a person approves the decision before disruptive action. Run each gate once under a drill clock, because the useful test is whether it still holds when the team is in a hurry.

Approval and evidence wording from each vendor's own pages, read 19 Nov 2026. These are descriptions, not test results.

| Vendor | Approval point, in the vendor's words | Evidence kept, in the vendor's words |
|---|---|---|
| Astelia | "The drafted ticket and the proposed firewall rule wait in the approval queue for a human click" | "every step lands in the execution log, and every decision in the audit log." |
| Cogent Security | "Decide where agents act independently and where they pause for sign-off. Configure by action type, severity, or asset sensitivity." | "every agent action is logged with its reasoning." |
| Endor Labs | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for Malware Responder. The workflows page says agents are "Read-only by default with centralized visibility and approval gates", and that only SCA Remediation and AI SAST Remediation change state, each behind a separate approval gate. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. The Agents Hub view is described as usage metering, not a compliance audit log. |
| Maze | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for the zero-day sweep itself. Maze's remediation page, which covers the fixes its agents deliver, says "Your team stays in control of what gets merged." | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for an agent action log. The pages say each recommendation carries its evidence and reasoning. |
| Onit Security | "Every agent action passes an approval gate, writes to an audit trail, and is reversible in one step, across both remediations and mitigations." | "Every conclusion traces back to the agent that produced it and the evidence it used." |
| Qualys | "Condition-based patch blocking and the ServiceNow change integration keep every change under existing approval processes." | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for Agent Insta or Agent Nyra. The audit trail Qualys describes belongs to Agent Val, a triage agent; see the [triage page](/use-cases/vulnerability-triage-and-remediation/). |
| Rival Security | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for the 0-day response agent. The pull request review described on Rival's home page ("so your team reviews instead of digging") belongs to its fix agents; see the [code and dependency fixes page](/use-cases/code-and-dependency-fixes/). | "Every agent action is traced, auditable and held to your policies, from the first prompt to the last change in production." |
| Seemplicity | None found on 19 Nov 2026. The pages read say each analyst returns a decision, evidence, fix options and an owner, and describe no approval gate. | "an auditable trail" |
| Vicarius | "No script generated by ScriptAI can reach a live asset without a human publishing it first." | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for a log of ScriptAI's generation decisions. The page says "Every script execution inherits vRx's full audit infrastructure, including operator logging, asset-level output, and timestamped results". |
| Zafran | "Keep humans in the loop with full command auditability and approval workflows at every step" | "full command auditability" |

A halt is not enough for a disclosure agent, because a firewall rule or script it proposed may already be live. Onit says actions are reversible in one step (vendor claim) and Qualys describes automatic rollback to a known-good state. Ask for the reversal to be shown on a test host before the first real disclosure ([kill switch and rollback](/evaluation-checklist/kill-switch-and-rollback/)). Boundaries on what an agent may do alone are in the guide to [what an agent should never do alone](/guides/what-an-agent-should-never-do-alone/).

## The record to keep for each disclosure

Agent disclosure record

- Advisory ID, and the time the agent first read it
- Inventory snapshot used (SBOM or asset data), and its date
- Per asset: affected, not affected, or could not verify, with the evidence
- Method used to verify (for example a read-only check through EDR)
- Proposed stopgap, and who must approve it
- Time of approval, approver, and time the stopgap went live
- Time and method of the rollback, if any

Onit's description is a useful benchmark: every conclusion traces back to the agent that produced it and the evidence it used (vendor statement, [Onit AI agents post](https://onit.security/blog/ai-agents-vulnerability-management/)). Astelia, Seemplicity and Zafran each describe execution logs, audit trails or command auditability, and none of their pages shows the log itself.

## Worked example: CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell), 14 Oct to 10 Nov 2026

CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in Google's Brotli decoder, bundled in Node.js, CVSS 3.1 score 9.8, CWE-787. Its timeline gives the agent's clock (NVD, the Node.js advisory, ELLIO and the CISA KEV entry, read 19 Nov 2026).

Dates from the sources named in the text, read 19 Nov 2026. Days are counted from 21 Oct 2026.

| Date | Event | Days from the 21 Oct release |
|---|---|---|
| 14 Oct 2026 | Node.js pre-alert of the 21 Oct release, naming the flaw as high severity | 7 days before |
| 21 Oct 2026 | Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 and Brotli 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1 released; advisory published | 0 |
| 22 Oct 2026 | NVD record and GitHub advisory published; public proof of concept appears | 1 |
| 26 Oct 2026 | First reported exploitation in the wild (ELLIO sensors) | 5 |
| 27 Oct 2026 | CISA adds it to KEV, due date 10 Nov 2026 (14 days after the listing) | 6 (the due date, 10 Nov, is 20) |

The five assets belong to a constructed organisation, not a real one; the versions and checks come from the CVE record. An agent given the advisory on 21 Oct and the inventory has 5 days before exploitation was reported.

Inventory of a constructed organisation. Version facts: CVE-2026-111497 record, Node.js advisory 21 Oct 2026, ELLIO.

| Asset | What the agent finds | Outcome | Who approves what |
|---|---|---|---|
| api-gateway, image pinned to node:24.22.0 | 24.22.0 is below 24.22.1, and a pinned tag stays vulnerable until the pin moves | Affected | Rebuild with node:24.22.1 in the normal change window; an emergency window needs a named approver |
| billing-worker, Node.js 22.23.4 | At or above the fixed 22.23.4. The check must be node --version: ELLIO reports that Node.js cherry-picked the fix without bumping the bundled version string, so process.versions.brotli reads 1.2.0 on both patched and vulnerable builds | Not affected | None; the evidence is the version output |
| legacy-reports, Node.js 20.x | End-of-life line, always affected, no fix issued | Affected, no patch | A person decides on a move to a supported line and on the stopgap |
| ml-service, PyPI Brotli 1.2.0 | A separate copy of Brotli below the fixed 1.2.1; a Node.js upgrade does not touch it | Affected | Upgrade Brotli to 1.2.1 through the pull request path |
| Vendor appliance embedding Brotli | No version data the agent can read | Could not verify | A person asks the supplier; counting it as safe is the common failure |

The exposure also depends on whether untrusted data reaches the decoder: inbound request bodies sent with Content-Encoding br on frameworks that inflate them, outbound responses fetched from URLs an attacker can influence, and direct calls. An agent that reports a path should show which of the three it checked.

The stopgap in the record is to reject inbound requests with Content-Encoding br at the proxy or load balancer. Its cost is an error for clients that send Brotli-compressed bodies, and it does not cover Brotli responses the application fetches from other servers. It changes live traffic, so it is the item a person approves, with the rollback time written next to it. Test the rule on a staging proxy before it goes live: send a request with the header (curl -i -X POST -H 'Content-Encoding: br' --data 'test' followed by the staging URL) and expect the rejection status you configured, for example 415; send the same request without the header and expect the normal response; send one with Content-Encoding: gzip and expect it to pass. Search the last 30 days of request logs for Content-Encoding br first, because any client that sends it will start to fail, and write the proxy change that removes the rule next to the approval. The Node.js advisory lists no workaround, so the stopgap comes from the researchers at [Aikido](https://www.aikido.dev/blog/node2shell-nodejs-brotli-rce-cve-2026-111497), who say they used it on internal services that could not be upgraded right away, and [ELLIO](https://ellio.tech/en/blog/node2shell-cve-2026-111497-rce-on-stock-nodejs-builds/). By 10 Nov 2026 the five assets should read affected assets fixed or on an approved exception, and the could-not-verify count should be zero or owned.

## Risk: poisoned advisory and feed content

The agent's inputs are text from advisories, blogs and feeds. MITRE ATLAS describes RAG Poisoning (AML.T0070): "Adversaries may inject malicious content into data indexed by a retrieval augmented generation (RAG) system to contaminate a future thread through RAG-based search results." ([MITRE ATLAS](https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml)). Take advisory facts such as fixed versions from the vendor's own advisory, and have the record cite it, so a reviewer can compare the agent's claim to the source.

## Sources

- [astelia.io/use-cases/deploy-astelia-agents](https://www.astelia.io/use-cases/deploy-astelia-agents), read 19 Nov 2026
- [astelia.io/post/closing-the-exposure-loop](https://www.astelia.io/post/closing-the-exposure-loop), read 19 Nov 2026
- [cogent.com](https://www.cogent.com/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [cogent.com/ai/cogent-ai-engine](https://www.cogent.com/ai/cogent-ai-engine), read 19 Nov 2026
- [cogent.com/ai/autonomy-levels](https://www.cogent.com/ai/autonomy-levels), read 19 Nov 2026
- [cogent.com/platform/cyber-defense-factory](https://www.cogent.com/platform/cyber-defense-factory), read 19 Nov 2026
- [cogent.com/platform/integrations](https://www.cogent.com/platform/integrations), read 19 Nov 2026
- [endorlabs.com/platform/agentic-workflows](https://www.endorlabs.com/platform/agentic-workflows), read 19 Nov 2026
- [endorlabs.com/solutions/agentic-remediation](https://www.endorlabs.com/solutions/agentic-remediation), read 19 Nov 2026
- [docs.endorlabs.com/secure-ai-coding/agents-hub](https://docs.endorlabs.com/secure-ai-coding/agents-hub), read 19 Nov 2026
- [mazehq.com/platform/cloud](https://mazehq.com/platform/cloud), read 19 Nov 2026
- [mazehq.com](https://mazehq.com/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [mazehq.com/platform/code](https://mazehq.com/platform/code), read 19 Nov 2026
- [mazehq.com/solutions/remediation](https://mazehq.com/solutions/remediation), read 19 Nov 2026
- [onit.security/blog/zero-day-response](https://onit.security/blog/zero-day-response/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [onit.security/blog/ai-agents-vulnerability-management](https://onit.security/blog/ai-agents-vulnerability-management/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [onit.security/platform](https://onit.security/platform/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [onit.security](https://onit.security/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [qualys.com/apps/agentic-ai](https://www.qualys.com/apps/agentic-ai), read 19 Nov 2026
- [qualys.com/apps/trurisk-eliminate](https://www.qualys.com/apps/trurisk-eliminate/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [qualys.com/apps/enterprise-trurisk-management](https://www.qualys.com/apps/enterprise-trurisk-management), read 19 Nov 2026
- [rival.security](https://rival.security/?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide), read 19 Nov 2026
- [docs.rival.security](https://docs.rival.security?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide), read 19 Nov 2026
- [rival.security/use-cases](https://rival.security/use-cases?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide), read 19 Nov 2026
- [rival.security/blog/php2shell-black-october-2026](https://rival.security/blog/php2shell-black-october-2026?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide), read 19 Nov 2026
- [seemplicity.ai/news/ai-analysts-autonomous-vulnerability-...](https://seemplicity.ai/news/ai-analysts-autonomous-vulnerability-response/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [seemplicity.ai](https://seemplicity.ai/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [seemplicity.ai/platform/agentic-workforce](https://seemplicity.ai/platform/agentic-workforce/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [vicarius.io/features/scriptai](https://www.vicarius.io/features/scriptai), read 19 Nov 2026
- [vicarius.io/features/vrx-analysis](https://www.vicarius.io/features/vrx-analysis), read 19 Nov 2026
- [zafran.io](https://www.zafran.io/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [zafran.io/platform](https://www.zafran.io/platform), read 19 Nov 2026
- [MITRE ATLAS data, ATLAS.yaml (techniques and mitigations)](https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Node.js, October 2026 security releases](https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/october-2026-security-releases), read 19 Nov 2026
- [CISA KEV entry for CVE-2026-111497](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-111497), read 19 Nov 2026
- [ELLIO, Node2Shell research](https://ellio.tech/en/blog/node2shell-cve-2026-111497-rce-on-stock-nodejs-builds/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [NVD record for CVE-2026-111497](https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-111497), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Aikido, Node2Shell: Node.js Brotli vulnerability (CVE-2026-111497) and the fix](https://www.aikido.dev/blog/node2shell-nodejs-brotli-rce-cve-2026-111497), read 19 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

Canonical: https://agenticaiincybersecurity.com/use-cases/new-disclosure-response/
