# AI Agents for Code Fixes: Who Merges, What to Keep

As of 19 Nov 2026, 16 vendors publish an agent that proposes a code change or dependency upgrade, usually as a pull request. The page covers who approves, what the pull request should carry and how to revert, with a worked example on CVE-2026-94545, fixed in Next.js 16.3.6 on 22 Sep 2026.

## Counts from the vendors directory

- 8 of 16 vendors let customers build or change the agent.
- 12 of 16 vendors describe an approval step.
- 7 of 16 vendors describe an audit trail.

Vendors: Aikido, Averlon, Backline, Checkmarx, Corridor, Cycode, Endor Labs, GitHub, Google, Maze, Mobb, Pixee, Rival Security, Seemplicity, Semgrep, Snyk.

## What the agents do and how vendors measure a fix

The agents read a finding or an advisory, change code or a dependency version, run the project's checks and open a pull request. No two vendors measure a good fix the same way, and every figure below is the vendor's own. Merge rate, review minutes and the share needing review answer three different questions, so ask for all three on your repositories.

- Snyk's VulnBump benchmark (15 Oct 2026) ran 307 real dependency upgrades, all agents on the same model, and counted a pass only if the vulnerability was gone and the project still installed, built and passed its tests. Snyk's Evo Remediation Agent passed 90.2%, Claude Code given Snyk's scan and recommended upgrade 77.5%, and Claude Code unaided 59.6% ([Snyk blog](https://snyk.io/blog/vulnbump/)). Snyk's launch post cites the same benchmark, rounding the agent's rate to 90% ([Snyk launch](https://snyk.io/news/snyk-launches-evo-agentic-appsec/)).
- Pixee reports 76% of its fixes merged after human review on production deployments ([Pixee FAQ](https://docs.pixee.ai/faq/general)).
- Averlon reports about 15 minutes of developer review per fix against 4 hours manually, for an unnamed customer ([Averlon blog](https://www.averlon.ai/blog/automating-remediation-application-infrastructure-security-issues)). Endor Labs reports fewer than 10% of pull requests needing human review after rollout ([Endor Labs](https://www.endorlabs.com/solutions/agentic-remediation)).

Vendors with a published agent for this job, alphabetical, the same fields for each vendor, read 19 Nov 2026. Claims are the vendor's own.

| Vendor | Agent named for this job | What the vendor says it does | Customer can build or change agents | Limits stated, or none found |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| [Aikido](https://www.aikido.dev/) | Aikido Agent and AutoFix | Vendor claim: AutoFix opens a ready-to-merge PR as soon as a CVE is found. | Yes. Customers set severity scope, repositories, containers and allowed actions for the triage agent, and add custom instructions, branch names, commit messages and merge rules for AutoFix. Authoring new agents: none found on the pages read. | The CVE triage agent is credit-based: each CVE it analyzes uses one credit, and only workspace admins change its settings. |
| [Averlon](https://www.averlon.ai/) | Remediation Agents | Vendor claim, customer unnamed and method not stated: an enterprise SaaS marketing technology company went from 3,400 tickets to 260 pull requests with owner-assigned tickets. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Checked the platform page, the home page and the remediation blog post; none describes customers building or editing their own agents. The blog says the remediation actions are used from the GitHub Marketplace and added to a workflow. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 on the pages read for: a log of agent actions, customer-built agents, or an approval setting beyond normal pull request review. |
| [Backline](https://backline.ai/) | Codie (Coder) | Vendor claim: fixes are tested against the repository's existing unit tests and checked for regressions before a person sees them. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Checked the home page, product page and owner-routing blog post. The blog says security teams set priorities, outreach limits, quiet hours and ownership policies, which tunes behavior but is not building agents. | Where no safe upgrade path exists, the platform hands the issue to engineers with an explanation instead of fixing it (vendor statement). |
| [Checkmarx](https://checkmarx.com/) | Remediation Assist; Developer Assist | Vendor claim: fixes should not break application logic, with noise reduction. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Checked the Assist agent family press release and the Checkmarx One Assist product page; neither addresses customer-built agents or instructions. The product page only says the Assist agents run in a guardrail-enforced environment. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for customer-built agents, or for how the Assist agents decide a fix is safe, on the two pages read. |
| [Corridor](https://corridor.dev/) | Corridor Agent (fixes) | Vendor claim: reviews, fixes and reported false positives feed back into what Corridor flags. | Yes. Teams write security standards in plain English and Corridor turns them into guardrails that apply in agent sessions and on pull requests. Authoring new agents: none found. | The backlog agent is described only in marketing copy and sample text on pages read; none found on 19 Nov 2026 for a docs page with its approval or logging details. |
| [Cycode](https://cycode.com/) | Fix & Remediation Agent | Vendor claim: generates context-aware code fixes with the reasoning behind the options, and in its workflow templates fixes a finding it has found exploitable and opens a pull request. | Yes. Agentic Workflows let customers set condition-based triggers, 20+ filter variables, confidence thresholds and chains of agents. Authoring new agents: none found on the pages read. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for stated limits of the Fix & Remediation Agent on the two pages read. |
| [Endor Labs](https://www.endorlabs.com/) | SCA Remediation (AURI Agent) | Vendor claim: agents run on the customer's own infrastructure and are open source, so the customer can read what an agent does before using it. | Yes. Agents are published as open markdown files that can be read and forked; the Agents Hub itself does not yet add custom agents, but points to an open source route. | You can view the agents in the Agents Hub but cannot yet add a custom agent inside Endor Labs. |
| [GitHub](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security) | Agentic autofix for code scanning; Copilot Autofix; Copilot assigned to Dependabot alerts | GitHub's claim: Copilot Autofix gives developers a starting code suggestion tied to their codebase and the alert. | Yes. Copilot uses the custom instructions that apply when generating a fix, and admins at enterprise, organization and repository level control whether autofix is on. Building a wholly new agent was not the topic of these pages. | GitHub states agentic autofix validates by re-running CodeQL and cannot confirm fixes for some alert types. |
| [Google](https://deepmind.google/discover/blog/introducing-codemender-an-ai-agent-for-code-security/) | CodeMender | Google's claim: validation is automatic and only patches meeting correctness and style checks reach human review. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Google describes CodeMender as research with maintainers being contacted gradually; a customer-configurable release was not described on the pages checked (DeepMind post, Google blog post). | Big Sleep is described as an agent that discovers vulnerabilities, which is outside the six jobs here; and the Gemini in Security agents page checked describes alert investigation and threat intelligence agents, with none found on 19 Nov 2026 for the six jobs. |
| [Maze](https://mazehq.com/) | Maze Code agents | Vendor claim: each fix arrives with the investigation behind it, so developers can review with context. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Checked the home, cloud, code and remediation pages; none describes customer-built agents. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 on the pages read for: customer-built agents or an action log; where no fix exists, agents recommend a mitigation instead (vendor statement). |
| [Mobb](https://mobb.ai/) | Mobb AI Agent | Vendor claim: one code change can remediate several reported findings without breaking code. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Nothing on customer-built agents or editing fix behavior. | Mobb works from findings that other SAST scanners report; none found on 19 Nov 2026 for dependency or cloud fixes on the pages read. |
| [Pixee](https://www.pixee.ai/) | Pixee fix generation | Vendor claim: fixes that fail its validation are not delivered. | Yes. Per-repository PIXEE.yaml, AI settings, and bring-your-own-model options let a team set what Pixee addresses and how PRs look. Authoring new agents: none found on the pages read. | Fixes are narrow: 1 to 5 line security changes, not general code generation (vendor description). |
| [Rival Security](https://rival.security/?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide) | Auto-remediate; Dependency audit | Vendor claim: one harness with built-in, vendor-built and customer-built agents, and a published write-up of agents triaging PHP2Shell exposure across customer repositories before scanners could detect the CVEs. | Yes. The home page offers three routes: use ready-made agents and extend them, have Rival engineers build tailored agents, or build your own. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for: public documentation, pricing, or named customers on the pages read. |
| [Seemplicity](https://seemplicity.ai/) | SAST Analyst | Vendor claim: each analyst returns a decision with its evidence, fix options and a likely owner. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Neither the home page nor the AI Analysts article nor the agentic workforce page mentions customer-built agents. | None found on 2026-11-19: approval gates, customer-built agents, or a date on the home page for the analyst list. |
| [Semgrep](https://semgrep.dev/) | Semgrep Agentic Workflows (fix step) | Semgrep's claim: the fix step opens a draft pull or merge request and leaves review and merge to the team ([Semgrep docs](https://docs.semgrep.dev/semgrep-code/triage-remediation/autofix.md)). | Yes. Agentic Workflows can be extended with an SDK, and Multimodal accepts per-project, per-rule Memories and custom instructions. | Multimodal mainly supports findings from Semgrep Code and needs the Semgrep AppSec Platform. |
| [Snyk](https://snyk.io/) | Evo Remediation Agent (dependency fixes) | Vendor claim: Evo Remediation Agent runs the full fix loop autonomously across newly written code and the backlog, starting with Snyk Open Source issues at launch. | None found on 19 Nov 2026. Pages read describe fixed agents with a stated role each; none found for customers building their own agents or editing agent behavior. Checked the Evo Agentic AppSec page, the launch announcement and Snyk's llms.txt index. | Availability is limited: three of the agents are in experimental preview for select customers and the Remediation Agent is in open preview. |

Dependabot security updates on GitHub raise a pull request to the minimum patched version; GitHub's page does not call that an agent, so it is not counted as a separate vendor.

## The pull request is the approval point

GitHub's agentic autofix produces a draft pull request and tells users to "Always review and test the generated changes before you merge the pull request". Alerts assigned to an agent create a session whose log can be reviewed from the alert timeline ([GitHub docs](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/code-scanning/autofix-for-code-scanning), [Dependabot alerts](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-alerts/about-dependabot-alerts)). Semgrep opens a draft pull or merge request and leaves review and merge to the team ([Semgrep docs](https://docs.semgrep.dev/semgrep-code/triage-remediation/autofix.md)). Snyk released Evo Remediation Agent campaigns in open preview on 22 Oct 2026; "the agent does not merge changes" ([Snyk blog](https://snyk.io/blog/evo-remediation-agent-open-preview/)).

Some vendors put a gate earlier. Endor Labs says approval can be required "before any file edit, branch push, or pull request", with every change checked against policy as allow, block or ask a human. Aikido says AutoFix shows the full diff and a confidence figure before anything merges ([Aikido AutoFix](https://www.aikido.dev/code/autofix)). Google said critique agents act as automated reviewers before a human researcher checks every CodeMender patch ([Google blog](https://blog.google/technology/safety-security/ai-security-frontier-strategy-tools/)).

Defaults and cost matter before enabling. GitHub's Copilot Autofix is on by default for any repository using CodeQL unless an administrator disables it, and each agentic autofix session consumes AI credits and GitHub Actions minutes. Aikido's triage agent spends one credit per CVE it analyzes. The [guide to the cost of running security agents](/guides/cost-of-running-security-agents/) covers cost per fix.

Approval and evidence wording from each vendor's own pages, read 19 Nov 2026. These are descriptions, not test results.

| Vendor | Approval point, in the vendor's words | Evidence kept, in the vendor's words |
|---|---|---|
| Aikido | "Fixes are proposed via pull requests you review and merge." | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for AutoFix. The ignore reason on Aikido's pages belongs to its CVE triage agent. |
| Averlon | None found on 19 Nov 2026. The blog calls each fix a ready-to-merge pull request and names no person who approves it; the 15 minutes of developer review per fix is a customer result, not an approval step. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 |
| Backline | "Each proposed fix comes with context, reasoning and validation, so teams can review, dig deeper, re prioritize if needed and finally approve with full confidence." | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for a log or trail of Codie's actions. Not counted: "Since every fix is delivered as a standard Pull Request, you can revert any change using your existing Git workflows and CI/CD rollback procedures" |
| Checkmarx | "Developers review and merge each fix; AppSec retains policy control and full traceability over every automated decision." | "AppSec retains policy control and full traceability over every automated decision." |
| Corridor | None found on 19 Nov 2026. The page shows fixes opened as pull requests and states no review or approval step for them. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 |
| Cycode | "generates context-aware code fixes that developers can review and approve." | "Every run records what triggered it, what each agent did, and which boundary applied." |
| Endor Labs | "Require approval before any file edit, branch push, or pull request, and check every change against your policy: allow, block, or ask a human." | None found on 19 Nov 2026. The Agents Hub view is described as usage metering, not a compliance audit log. |
| GitHub | "Always review and test the generated changes before you merge the pull request." | "on the alert timeline to review the agent's log." |
| Google | "Currently, all patches generated by CodeMender are reviewed by human researchers" | None found on 19 Nov 2026 |
| Maze | "Your team stays in control of what gets merged." | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for an agent action log. The pages say each recommendation carries its evidence and reasoning. |
| Mobb | None found on 19 Nov 2026. The page calls the fixes ready to merge and states no review or approval step. | None found on 19 Nov 2026 |
| Pixee | "Pixee generates fixes as pull requests that go through your existing review and CI/CD pipeline." | "PR-based change tracking for every remediation." |
| Rival Security | "Rival plans the fix, tests it, and opens the pull request, so your team reviews instead of digging." | "Every agent action is traced, auditable and held to your policies, from the first prompt to the last change in production." |
| Seemplicity | None found on 19 Nov 2026. The pages read say each analyst returns a decision, evidence, fix options and an owner, and describe no approval gate. | "an auditable trail" |
| Semgrep | "You remain in full control over reviewing and merging the PR or MR." | None found on 19 Nov 2026 for a log or trail of the fix step's actions. Not counted: "pipelines that are testable, auditable, and tailored to an organization's specific needs." |
| Snyk | "A fix that might break the build is queued for approval, not merged, so Remediation Agent is built to deliver mergeable fixes." | "every agent decision is captured in an audit trail." |

## What the pull request should carry, and how to revert

Agent pull request checklist, code and dependency fixes

- Link to the finding and the scanner that raised it
- What changed, in one sentence, and the version moved from and to
- Why this urgency: which advisory or rating the agent used
- Whether the vulnerable code path is reachable in this repository
- Build and test results, with the run link
- Rescan result after the change, from the scanner not the agent
- Agent name, version and model; the session log link
- Reviewer name and decision, with the time
- How to revert, and which services deployed the change

Backline states that because every fix is a standard pull request, a team can "revert any change using your existing Git workflows and CI/CD rollback procedures" ([Backline](https://backline.ai/product/)). That holds for any vendor that delivers only pull requests. It does not cover a dependency change already deployed: rollback then needs a release, so write the revert path per service. One third-party account bounds the human cost: Trail of Bits wrote that preparing and reviewing a straightforward backport takes about 30 minutes of human attention and a harder one around three hours, across a project that helped deliver fixes for 149 distinct CVEs into stable Linux kernel releases ([Trail of Bits, 2 Nov 2026](https://blog.trailofbits.com/2026/11/02/backporting-security-fixes-at-scale-with-codex/)). For a fix, the outcome to check is a clean rescan of the merged code, as the [verify after each change](/evaluation-checklist/verify-after-each-change/) item says.

## Worked example: CVE-2026-94545, Satori and Next.js next/og

The CVE and its dates are real; the repository is illustrative. CVE-2026-94545 is an SVG escaping flaw in Satori, which Next.js ships inside the Node.js implementation of ImageResponse in next/og. It affects satori 0.0.27 up to but excluding 0.33.5 and next 16.2.0 up to but excluding 16.3.6. It needs attacker-controlled values to reach SVG content, attributes or styles. The Edge ImageResponse is not affected. CISA has not listed it and no exploitation report exists (data read 19 Nov 2026; NVD, GitHub advisories GHSA-vcvr-r3jv-pc5j and GHSA-wx4j-mvgx-mqwp).

Dates from the vendor advisories and release notes, read 19 Nov 2026. The day gaps are counted from 22 Sep 2026.

| Date | Event | What it means for an agent |
|---|---|---|
| 22 Sep 2026 | Next.js 16.3.6 released with the fix | A fixed version exists, but no advisory is published yet |
| 30 Sep 2026 | Next.js advisory published as critical, CVSS 4.0 score 9.5; NVD publishes the record using the Satori advisory, CVSS 4.0 score 5.3 | The same flaw carries two CVSS scores, 8 days after the fix |
| 27 Oct 2026 | Satori advisory GHSA-wx4j-mvgx-mqwp published, severity medium, patched in 0.33.5 | An agent that waits for the Satori advisory alone opens its pull request 35 days after the fix release |

Take a repository on Next.js 16.3.2 with an opengraph-image route on the default Node.js runtime that places a title from a query parameter into the image. A good agent pull request does five things, and a reviewer should look for each:

1. Bumps next to 16.3.6, and satori to 0.33.5 if it is a direct dependency, inside the same minor line.
2. States the reason for urgency from the Next.js advisory's 9.5 and not the 5.3, because the route passes a request value into the SVG. A route that renders only fixed text would be rated lower.
3. Reports the runtime of each ImageResponse route and the data flow into the JSX, since those two facts decide exposure.
4. Shows the build, the tests and a check that generated images still look right, which the CVE record lists as the cost of the upgrade.
5. Leaves the Edge runtime switch out. The vendor says Edge is not affected but does not list it as a workaround, and it brings Edge runtime limits, so it is a code change for a person to approve.

After merge, the rescan must show both packages at or above the fixed versions. If the team cannot upgrade, the vendor's own workaround is to stop passing attacker-controlled values into the SVG, at the cost of user-supplied text in generated images.

Reverting after merge, worked for the same example: once 16.3.6 is merged and deployed and a service then fails (for instance, generated images render wrongly), reverting the pull request puts next back at 16.3.2, which is the vulnerable range (16.2.0 up to but excluding 16.3.6), so the revert reopens the exposure and has to be written as a decision, not an undo:

1. Revert the merge on the main branch (git revert -m 1 followed by the merge commit) so package.json and the lockfile return to next 16.3.2, and run the build and tests.
2. Deploy the revert as a new release of each service that took the upgrade. The services still running 16.3.6 stay on it until that release ships, so the revert does not remove the fix by itself.
3. While the revert is live, apply the workaround given above and record the dates the vulnerable version was running.
4. Keep the fix pull request open, or re-open it, with the failure noted, and time-box the next attempt. The advisory is rated 9.5 by Next.js and 5.3 by NVD, so the time-box is a judgment a named person records.

## Risk: instructions hidden in what the agent reads

A code fix agent reads repository text it does not control: issue bodies, comments, dependency READMEs, advisory text. MITRE ATLAS describes indirect prompt injection (AML.T0051.001): "An adversary may inject prompts indirectly via separate data channel ingested by the LLM such as include text or multimedia pulled from databases or websites." ([MITRE ATLAS](https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml)). The pull request is the control: the agent's branch can be reviewed, but a token that can push to protected branches cannot. See the checklist item on [untrusted input](/evaluation-checklist/untrusted-input/).

## Sources

- [snyk.io/blog/vulnbump](https://snyk.io/blog/vulnbump/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [blog.trailofbits.com/2026/11/02/backporting-security-fixe...](https://blog.trailofbits.com/2026/11/02/backporting-security-fixes-at-scale-with-codex/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [deepmind.google/discover/blog/introducing-codemender-an-a...](https://deepmind.google/discover/blog/introducing-codemender-an-ai-agent-for-code-security/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [snyk.io/news/snyk-launches-evo-agentic-appsec](https://snyk.io/news/snyk-launches-evo-agentic-appsec/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [docs.pixee.ai/faq/general](https://docs.pixee.ai/faq/general), read 19 Nov 2026
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- [seemplicity.ai](https://seemplicity.ai/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [seemplicity.ai/news/ai-analysts-autonomous-vulnerability-...](https://seemplicity.ai/news/ai-analysts-autonomous-vulnerability-response/), read 19 Nov 2026
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- [docs.semgrep.dev/semgrep-multimodal/customize.md](https://docs.semgrep.dev/semgrep-multimodal/customize.md), read 19 Nov 2026
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- [snyk.io/evo/agentic-appsec](https://snyk.io/evo/agentic-appsec/), read 19 Nov 2026
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- [github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml](https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml), read 19 Nov 2026
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- [snyk.io/blog/evo-remediation-agent-open-preview](https://snyk.io/blog/evo-remediation-agent-open-preview/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [endorlabs.com/learn/endor-labs-openai-strengthening-the-d...](https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/endor-labs-openai-strengthening-the-defense-factory-with-accelerated-remediation), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Cycode, cycode.com/agentic-workflows](https://cycode.com/agentic-workflows/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Cycode, AI Teammates blog post](https://cycode.com/blog/the-future-of-agentic-ai-appsec-introducing-ai-teammates/), read 19 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

Canonical: https://agenticaiincybersecurity.com/use-cases/code-and-dependency-fixes/
