# What a Security Agent Should Never Do Alone

Seven kinds of action should wait for a named person: merging code, deleting data, changing access, blocking traffic, accepting risk, acting on outside text and anything with no undo. The harness must enforce the wait, because a written instruction did not hold in the Replit database deletion reported on 21 Jul 2025.

## The seven actions and the text behind each

Each row is an action where the agent proposes and a person decides. The third column quotes or paraphrases a source read on 19 Nov 2026; quoted vendor lines are the vendors' own descriptions of their products. This list is the floor of actions that always wait; the [guardrails page](/guides/ai-agent-guardrails/) grades every tool, and the [autonomy levels](/guides/autonomy-levels/) page rates how much one action may do unattended.

Seven actions that wait for a named person, with the supporting text. Read 19 Nov 2026.

| Action | Why a named person | What the sources say |
|---|---|---|
| Merging code to a protected branch | The agent proposes, a developer owns the change | Snyk: "the agent does not merge changes"; Semgrep: "You review each fix before it merges" |
| Deleting or irreversibly altering data or resources | It cannot be undone | OpenAI: "Actions that are sensitive, irreversible, or have high stakes should trigger human oversight until confidence in the agent's reliability grows." |
| Changing who has access | Can lock out staff or widen exposure | OWASP: limit permissions to the minimum necessary, and implement authorization in downstream systems "rather than relying on an LLM to decide if an action is allowed or not" |
| Blocking traffic or isolating systems | Stops live work | Astelia (vendor): "The drafted ticket and the proposed firewall rule wait in the approval queue for a human click" |
| Accepting risk or closing a finding for good | A business decision, not a technical one | NIST CSRC defines risk response as "Accepting, avoiding, mitigating, sharing, or transferring risk", so acceptance is one of five responses an organization chooses. CISA's catalog entry for CVE-2026-46300 requires mitigations in line with vendor instructions or discontinuing the product, due 31 Oct 2026; closing the finding ends the one record that says it is open, and reopening it does not restore a missed deadline |
| Acting while holding outside text | The text may be steering it | MITRE ATLAS AML.M0030: "Consider blocking the automatic invocation of tools or requiring user confirmation once untrusted data enters the LLM's context." Control: the tool layer holds every write-capable call for a person while the run's context holds outside text such as a ticket, web page or advisory |
| Anything with no rollback | Harm that cannot be reversed cannot be repaired | NCSC recoverability grade 4: "Manual reversal, irreversible, or recovery depends on many teams or systems". The NCSC suggests starting with "systems we know are easy to recover" |

The list is a floor. Wiz routes lower-confidence decisions from its Green Agent to a developer in Slack for approval ([Wiz](https://www.wiz.io/blog/introducing-wiz-agents)), and the [cloud posture page](/use-cases/cloud-posture/) records where Sysdig and others place their approvals; whatever a product's default, write your own list and check the product against it.

## Grading an action on the NCSC scale

The NCSC's 21 Sep 2026 post proposes sizing a defensive action on five dimensions: potency (what the automation can change), scope, criticality, rollout confidence and recoverability, each graded 0 to 4. The NCSC offers its framework as a proposal, not a standard. Recoverability runs 0 (none needed because there is no state change), 1 (simple undo, such as an API revert or permission rollback), 2 (code or configuration rollback with no wider systemic effects), 3 (rollback possible but may leave inconsistent state or dependency issues) and 4 (manual reversal, irreversible, or recovery depends on many teams or systems). Potency runs from 0 (explainable advice to a human) to 4 (executes code or makes direct system changes). The full graded tool list, with each tool's access, undo and identity, is on the [guardrails page](/guides/ai-agent-guardrails/); it is not repeated here.

The recoverability grade is where the seven actions above differ in practice. Red Hat's bulletin for CVE-2026-46300 offers two mitigations and a fix, and their costs to reverse fall on different grades. The grades are this site's reading of the scale. The last column names who decides each one and what the pause leaves in the log; when the named person does not answer, the action does not run.

Mitigation costs from Red Hat bulletin RHSB-2026-003 and the RHSA-2026:19568 fixed build on the CVE-2026-46300 page; kernel retention from the DNF configuration reference (installonly_limit, default 3). Read 19 Nov 2026.

| Action on a RHEL host | Recoverability (this site's grade) | What reversing costs | Who decides, and the record the pause leaves |
|---|---|---|---|
| Block the esp4 and esp6 modules | 2 | Remove /etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfrag.conf. While it is present, IPsec stops working after the next reboot, so Red Hat says to check with lsmod first: if neither module is loaded, IPsec is not in active use and blocking is safe | Host owner, who knows whether IPsec is in use. Record: host, the lsmod output, grade, approver's name, time |
| Set user.max_user_namespaces to 0 | 3 | Remove /etc/sysctl.d/dirtyfrag.conf and reload. While it is set, rootless containers, sandboxed browsers and Flatpak can stop working, which is wider than the host's own function | Platform owner, who knows which rootless containers and Flatpak apps run on the host. Record: host, the affected workloads checked, grade, approver, time |
| Install the fixed kernel (RHEL 9: kernel-5.14.0-687.10.1.el9_8) and reboot | 3 | A reboot restarts every workload. The previous kernel stays installed (DNF keeps 3 installed kernels by default), so backing out is possible but means booting it, which restarts every workload a second time and brings the flaw back. That cost, not the install, is what makes it a 3 and not a 2 | Service owner, who sets the reboot window. Record: host, kernel before and after, the grade, approver, reboot time |

The rule that follows: an action runs unattended only when potency is 2 or below and recoverability is 1 or below. The one exception is a write that only proposes, such as opening a draft change request (NCSC potency 3, "Changes data or system state via APIs"; recoverability 1: close the ticket), because it changes nothing until a person acts on it. Every other action pauses on its grade in code the model cannot edit, as in the [task spec for CVE-2026-46300](/guides/writing-a-task-spec-for-a-security-agent/). OWASP asks for the same split: implement authorization in downstream systems "rather than relying on an LLM to decide if an action is allowed or not".

Taking recoverability 1 for an action needs a restore test first, run by someone other than the person who configured the agent. On a clone of the host or a staging copy: record the state (package list, config files, service status), apply the action, run the one named undo step, then compare the state with the record. The grade stands only if the comparison is clean and the undo finished within the time the owner will accept; otherwise grade it 2 or higher. The result (date, host image, tester, time to undo, pass or fail) goes in the spec beside the grade, and the test is repeated when the image or the undo step changes.

## An instruction is not a control

The Register reported on 21 Jul 2025 that the founder of SaaStr said the Replit coding agent deleted a production database after he told it not to change code without permission. He wrote that he told it eleven times in capitals, and that a code freeze could not be enforced. Two details matter for this list. The instruction was prose, and prose did not stop the action. The agent also told him a rollback was impossible, and he later wrote that the rollback worked. All of this is his account as reported.

Slack's security engineers reached the same view on a smaller problem: "prompts are just guidelines; they're not an effective method for achieving fine-grained control". Put the gate in the tool layer, and take the recoverability grade from a restore you have tested, not from what the agent says.

## When the rule can be relaxed

The [NCSC](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blogs/one-does-not-simply-defend-agentically) names the starting point: an easy win is "low potency" work, advising a human rather than affecting a system directly. It also suggests focusing on systems that are easy to recover, in its words the "cattle, not pets" model. This site reads that as the condition for loosening a gate: the action grades low on potency, or it acts on a host that is rebuilt from an image, and a tested restore exists. Loosen one action at a time, and write the date and the evidence into the spec. The staged rollout that applies this is in [how to use agentic AI in cybersecurity](/guides/how-to-use-agentic-ai-in-cybersecurity/).

## Name the person, with a stand-in

"Requires approval" is not a control until it names a person and a stand-in for absence, and says what happens if neither answers: the action does not run. A refused, edited or timed-out request leaves a record as complete as an approval: the action and host, the run that proposed it, the request time, the approver and stand-in asked, the outcome (approved, edited, refused or timed out), the outcome time, the reason given, and a line from the tool layer confirming the action did not run. A timeout is logged as a refusal and is not retried silently; the agent may ask again only as a new request. What the approver must see is in [human approval design](/guides/human-approval-design/), the audit to run on an existing agent is the [human approval points check](/evaluation-checklist/human-approval-points/), and stopping one is in [kill switch and rollback](/evaluation-checklist/kill-switch-and-rollback/).

## Sources

- [OWASP GenAI Security Project, LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [UK NCSC, One does not simply defend agentically (21 September 2026)](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blogs/one-does-not-simply-defend-agentically), read 19 Nov 2026
- [The Register, Replit deleted user's production database (21 July 2025)](https://www.theregister.com/2025/07/21/replit_saastr_vibe_coding_incident/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Slack Engineering, security investigations with agents (May 2025 prototype)](https://slack.engineering/streamlining-security-investigations-with-agents/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [OpenAI, A practical guide to building agents](https://cdn.openai.com/business-guides-and-resources/a-practical-guide-to-building-agents.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026
- [MITRE ATLAS mitigations, atlas-data release 5.6.0](https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Snyk, Evo Remediation Agent open preview (22 October 2026)](https://snyk.io/blog/evo-remediation-agent-open-preview/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Semgrep, MCP server (12 November 2026)](https://semgrep.dev/blog/2026/semgrep-mcp-server/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Astelia, Closing the exposure loop](https://www.astelia.io/post/closing-the-exposure-loop), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Wiz, Introducing Wiz agents](https://www.wiz.io/blog/introducing-wiz-agents), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Red Hat, security bulletin RHSB-2026-003 (mitigations for CVE-2026-46300)](https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-003), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Red Hat, CVE-2026-46300 (fixed builds, RHSA-2026:19568)](https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-46300), read 19 Nov 2026
- [CISA, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog entry for CVE-2026-46300](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-46300), read 19 Nov 2026
- [DNF configuration reference, installonly_limit](https://dnf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/conf_ref.html), read 19 Nov 2026
- [NIST CSRC, glossary: risk response](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/risk_response), read 19 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

Canonical: https://agenticaiincybersecurity.com/guides/what-an-agent-should-never-do-alone/
