# Agentic AI Security Terms: 40 Defined, 19 Quoted

40 terms used when AI agents do security work, in four groups: the agent, risks and controls, records and testing, and the six jobs. 21 are the site's own words, marked (site term); 19 are quoted from the issuer named in each entry, such as NIST CSRC, OWASP or MITRE ATLAS. Read 19 Nov 2026.

## Terms for the agent itself

- **AI system.** "a machine-based system that is designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and that may exhibit adaptiveness after deployment, and that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments" ([EU AI Act, Article 3(1)](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/3/)). An agent is an AI system in this sense.
- **AI agent.** "systems where LLMs dynamically direct their own processes and tool usage, maintaining control over how they accomplish tasks" ([Anthropic, Building effective agents](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents)). Contrast with a workflow.
- **Workflow.** "systems where LLMs and tools are orchestrated through predefined code paths" ([Anthropic](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents)). The path is fixed in code; an agent chooses its own.
- **Agent harness.** "A harness is every piece of code, configuration, and execution logic that isn't the model itself" ([LangChain](https://blog.langchain.com/the-anatomy-of-an-agent-harness/)). See the [agent harness section](/agent-harness/).
- **Tool.** "Tools are the external APIs and services an agent uses to take action in the world, which must be secured with least-privilege permissions" ([Google SAIF](https://saif.google/focus-on-agents)).
- **Tool invocation.** "Adversaries may use their access to an AI agent to invoke tools the agent has access to" ([MITRE ATLAS, AML.T0053](https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml)). ATLAS lists tools as integrations with other applications, access to data sources and the ability to execute code, which is why tool scope is the first limit to set.
- **Sandbox.** "A restricted, controlled execution environment that prevents potentially malicious software, such as mobile code, from accessing any system resources except those for which the software is authorized" ([NIST CSRC, from CNSSI 4009-2022](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/sandbox)).
- **MCP server** (site term). A connector that exposes a product's functions to an agent as tools. Example: Semgrep describes its beta MCP server as letting an agent search findings, triage in bulk, generate fixes and file tickets using the user's existing permissions ([Semgrep, 12 Nov 2026](https://semgrep.dev/blog/2026/semgrep-mcp-server/)).
- **Cyber classifier** (site term). A safeguard in a model that blocks requests it judges to be cyber misuse, which security agents can trip in normal work. Anthropic's Defense Access tier offers vetted teams reduced cyber blocking ([Anthropic](https://www.anthropic.com/news/cyber-verification-program)). Rival reports that about one thread in twenty of its package-analysis agents is normally blocked and that it measured about one in five on 5 Nov 2026 ([Rival](https://rival.security/blog/openai-cyber-classifier-security-agents?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=guide)).
- **Deployer.** "a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body using an AI system under its authority except where the AI system is used in the course of a personal non-professional activity" ([EU AI Act, Article 3](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/3/)). A security team that runs a supplier's agent is a deployer in this sense; the supplier is the provider.

## Risks and controls

- **Prompt injection.** "Prompt Injection Vulnerability occurs when user prompts alter the LLM's behavior or output in unintended ways" ([OWASP LLM01:2025](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm01-prompt-injection/)). For an agent, text in a ticket, a code comment or a web page is an input.
- **Context poisoning.** "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the context used by an AI agent's large language model (LLM) to influence the responses it generates or actions it takes" ([MITRE ATLAS, AML.T0080](https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml)). ATLAS names memory and thread as the two ways to do it, so memory is an attack surface.
- **Excessive agency.** "Excessive Agency is the vulnerability that enables damaging actions to be performed in response to unexpected, ambiguous or manipulated outputs from an LLM, regardless of what is causing the LLM to malfunction" ([OWASP LLM06:2025](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/)). OWASP: "The root cause of Excessive Agency is typically one or more of: excessive functionality; excessive permissions; excessive autonomy".
- **Least privilege.** "A security principle that a system should restrict the access privileges of users (or processes acting on behalf of users) to the minimum necessary to accomplish assigned tasks" ([NIST CSRC, from CNSSI 4009-2022](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/least_privilege)). MITRE ATLAS applies it to agents: "the principle of least privilege so that the agent is only granted the necessary permissions to access tools and resources required to accomplish its designated task(s)".
- **Human in the loop.** "Systems should require the user or another human stakeholder to approve AI agent actions before the agent takes them" ([MITRE ATLAS, AML.M0029](https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml)). OWASP: "Utilise human-in-the-loop control to require a human to approve high-impact actions before they are taken" ([OWASP](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/)).
- **Human oversight.** "Human oversight shall aim to prevent or minimise the risks to health, safety or fundamental rights" ([EU AI Act, Article 14](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/14/)). Article 14 applies to high-risk AI systems; read it as a model for approval design elsewhere. See [human approval design](/guides/human-approval-design/).
- **Approval gate** (site term). A point where the agent pauses until a named person or rule allows it to continue. Cogent describes setting it "by action type, severity, or asset sensitivity" ([Cogent](https://www.cogent.com/ai/cogent-ai-engine)). MITRE ATLAS (AML.M0030) puts the gate where outside text enters: "Consider blocking the automatic invocation of tools or requiring user confirmation once untrusted data enters the LLM's context" ([ATLAS](https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml)).
- **Autonomy level** (site term). How much an agent may do without asking, set per kind of action. Worked number: snoozing a finding to a date totals 9 of 20 on the five 0-to-4 dimensions of the UK NCSC scale, which places it at level 4, approval before the action. The guide on [autonomy levels](/guides/autonomy-levels/) sets out five levels ([NCSC](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blogs/one-does-not-simply-defend-agentically)).
- **Standing rule** (site term). An approval that carries forward and applies to later matches without asking again. Onit describes approving a decision as creating "a standing rule for every matching exposure, now and later" ([Onit](https://onit.security/blog/ai-agents-vulnerability-management/)).
- **Stop button** (site term). A control outside the model that halts the agent's tool calls, held by a named person. The EU AI Act asks that the overseer can "interrupt the system through a 'stop' button or a similar procedure that allows the system to come to a halt in a safe state" ([Article 14](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/14/)). See [kill switch and rollback](/evaluation-checklist/kill-switch-and-rollback/).
- **Rollback** (site term). Returning a system to its state before the agent's change. A stop does not do this: partial changes persist until someone reverses them. Example: after Replit's agent deleted a production database in July 2025, the user wrote on 19 Jul that the agent had said a rollback was impossible and that "the rollback did work" ([The Register, 21 Jul 2025](https://www.theregister.com/2025/07/21/replit_saastr_vibe_coding_incident/)). A rollback route has to be tested before the agent runs.
- **Over-reliance** (site term). An approver accepting the agent's output without checking it. Article 14 asks that overseers be enabled "to remain aware of the possible tendency of automatically relying or over-relying on the output produced by a high-risk AI system" ([EU AI Act, Article 14](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/14/)).

## Records and testing

- **Audit trail.** "A chronological record that reconstructs and examines the sequence of activities surrounding or leading to a specific operation, procedure, or event in a security relevant transaction from inception to final result" ([NIST CSRC, from CNSSI 4009-2022](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/audit_trail)). MITRE ATLAS asks agent deployers to log "the intermediate steps of agentic actions and decisions, data access and tool use, installation commands, and identity of the agent" (AML.M0024).
- **Evidence record** (site term). The per-decision entry that lets someone else check why the agent did what it did. Example: Pixee persists each triage decision with a timestamp, the classification outcome and the model's justification ([Pixee docs](https://docs.pixee.ai/enterprise/compliance)).
- **Eval** (site term). A test that runs an agent on a set of tasks and grades the results. Anthropic: "Agent evaluations typically combine three types of graders: code-based, model-based, and human" ([Anthropic](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/demystifying-evals-for-ai-agents)). See [AI agent evals](/guides/ai-agent-evals/).
- **Grader** (site term). The part of an eval that decides whether one trial passed. The three types are code-based (a test or check runs), model-based (another model judges) and human. Snyk's VulnBump uses a code-based one: an upgrade passes only if the vulnerabilities are gone and the project still installs, builds and passes its tests ([Snyk](https://snyk.io/blog/vulnbump/)).
- **Outcome** (site term). The state of the real system after the agent finishes, as opposed to what the agent says it did. Anthropic's example: a flight-booking agent "might say 'Your flight has been booked'", but the outcome is whether a reservation exists in the database ([Anthropic](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/demystifying-evals-for-ai-agents)).
- **Success criteria** (site term). The written, checkable conditions an agent must meet for a job before it gets production access. Anthropic lists the properties of good ones: "Specific: Clearly define what you want to achieve" and "Measurable: Use quantitative metrics or well-defined qualitative scales" ([Anthropic docs](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/test-and-evaluate/define-success)). The pass thresholds are on [success criteria and test sets](/evaluation-checklist/success-criteria-and-test-sets/).
- **Benchmark** (site term). A fixed set of tasks used to compare agents or versions. Example: Snyk's VulnBump has 307 real dependency upgrades from 43 repositories ([Snyk](https://snyk.io/blog/vulnbump/)). The [benchmarks section](/benchmarks/) covers six public benchmark families.
- **Drift** (site term). A change in an agent's behavior over time, with the same inputs, after a model, prompt or tool changes. The UK NCSC guidelines ask providers to measure outputs so they "observe sudden and gradual changes in behaviour affecting security" ([NCSC](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development)).

## Terms for the six jobs

- **Vulnerability.** "Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source" ([NIST CSRC, FIPS 200](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/vulnerability)).
- **Triage** (site term). Deciding which findings matter in this environment and why. Endor Labs describes its triage agent as labeling every finding "as true positive, false positive, or unknown, with written reasoning your team can audit" ([Endor Labs, 11 Nov 2026](https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/how-ai-sast-works)).
- **False positive.** "An alert that incorrectly indicates that a vulnerability is present" ([NIST CSRC, from SP 800-115](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/false_positive)).
- **Reachability** (site term). Whether vulnerable code can actually be called from the application. Snyk describes its analysis as "identifying whether your application is calling a code element (for example, functions, classes, modules, and more) related to the vulnerability" ([Snyk docs](https://docs.snyk.io/manage-risk/prioritize-issues-for-fixing/reachability-analysis)).
- **Exploitability** (site term). Whether a vulnerability can be exploited here, given this environment's configuration and controls, not in general. Maze: "Exploitable means a vulnerability could technically be exploited given the specific configuration, controls, and context of your environment" ([Maze](https://mazehq.com/platform/cloud)).
- **SBOM.** "A formal record containing the details and supply chain relationships of various components used in building software" ([NIST CSRC, from SP 800-161r1 and E.O. 14028](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/software_bill_of_materials)).
- **New disclosure** (site term). A newly published vulnerability or advisory a team must match to its assets. Example: Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938), a flaw in OpenJDK's AVX-512 Base64 decoder disclosed on 17 Nov 2026; Oracle's November 2026 Critical Security Patch Update lists the affected Java SE builds ([Oracle](https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cspunov2026.html)). See [14 dates to know](/dates-to-know/).
- **Fix pull request** (site term). A proposed code or dependency change that a developer reviews and merges. Snyk's Remediation Agent campaigns open pull requests with dependency upgrades, and "the agent does not merge changes" ([Snyk, 22 Oct 2026](https://snyk.io/blog/evo-remediation-agent-open-preview/)).
- **Access certification** (site term). A named person's confirmation, on a schedule, that an account or identity still needs the access it holds. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 control AC-6(7) asks organizations to "Review" privileges "to validate the need for such privileges" and to "Reassign or remove privileges, if necessary, to correctly reflect organizational mission and business needs" ([NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 catalog, OSCAL](https://github.com/usnistgov/oscal-content/blob/main/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/json/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.json)).
- **Threat modeling.** "A form of risk assessment that models aspects of the attack and defense sides of a logical entity, such as a piece of data, an application, a host, a system, or an environment" ([NIST CSRC, from SP 800-53 Rev. 5](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/threat_modeling)).

## Sources

- [artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/3/](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/3/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents), read 19 Nov 2026
- [blog.langchain.com/the-anatomy-of-an-agent-harness/](https://blog.langchain.com/the-anatomy-of-an-agent-harness/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [rival.security/](https://rival.security/?utm_source=agenticaiincybersecurity.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=reference), read 19 Nov 2026
- [saif.google/focus-on-agents](https://saif.google/focus-on-agents), read 19 Nov 2026
- [github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml](https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml), read 19 Nov 2026
- [csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/sandbox](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/sandbox), read 19 Nov 2026
- [semgrep.dev/blog/2026/semgrep-mcp-server/](https://semgrep.dev/blog/2026/semgrep-mcp-server/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [anthropic.com/news/cyber-verification-program](https://www.anthropic.com/news/cyber-verification-program), read 19 Nov 2026
- [genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm01-prompt-injection/](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm01-prompt-injection/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/least_privilege](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/least_privilege), read 19 Nov 2026
- [artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/14/](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/14/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [cogent.com/ai/cogent-ai-engine](https://www.cogent.com/ai/cogent-ai-engine), read 19 Nov 2026
- [onit.security/blog/ai-agents-vulnerability-management/](https://onit.security/blog/ai-agents-vulnerability-management/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/audit_trail](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/audit_trail), read 19 Nov 2026
- [docs.pixee.ai/enterprise/compliance](https://docs.pixee.ai/enterprise/compliance), read 19 Nov 2026
- [anthropic.com/engineering/demystifying-evals-for-ai-agents](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/demystifying-evals-for-ai-agents), read 19 Nov 2026
- [snyk.io/blog/vulnbump/](https://snyk.io/blog/vulnbump/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development), read 19 Nov 2026
- [csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/vulnerability](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/vulnerability), read 19 Nov 2026
- [endorlabs.com/learn/how-ai-sast-works](https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/how-ai-sast-works), read 19 Nov 2026
- [csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/false_positive](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/false_positive), read 19 Nov 2026
- [mazehq.com/platform/cloud](https://mazehq.com/platform/cloud), read 19 Nov 2026
- [csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/software_bill_of_materials](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/software_bill_of_materials), read 19 Nov 2026
- [snyk.io/blog/evo-remediation-agent-open-preview/](https://snyk.io/blog/evo-remediation-agent-open-preview/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/threat_modeling](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/threat_modeling), read 19 Nov 2026
- [theregister.com/2025/07/21/replit_saastr_vibe_coding_incident/](https://www.theregister.com/2025/07/21/replit_saastr_vibe_coding_incident/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [platform.claude.com/docs/en/test-and-evaluate/define-success](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/test-and-evaluate/define-success), read 19 Nov 2026
- [docs.snyk.io/manage-risk/prioritize-issues-for-fixing/reachability-analysis](https://docs.snyk.io/manage-risk/prioritize-issues-for-fixing/reachability-analysis), read 19 Nov 2026
- [github.com/usnistgov/oscal-content, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 catalog](https://github.com/usnistgov/oscal-content/blob/main/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/json/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.json), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Oracle, Critical Security Patch Update, November 2026 (CVE-2026-114938)](https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cspunov2026.html), read 19 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

Canonical: https://agenticaiincybersecurity.com/glossary/
