# Agent Evaluation Checklist: 20 Questions and Tests

The checklist has 20 questions in 7 areas that a security team settles in writing before an AI agent may change a production system. Each question has a test to run on your own systems and a line quoted from NIST, OWASP, MITRE, NCSC, the EU AI Act, CISA, Anthropic or OpenAI guidance, read 19 Nov 2026.

## The checklist

- [ ] Q01 (Scope of the job): Does this security job need an agent at all, or would a fixed workflow with a model call inside it do the work?
  An agent chooses its own steps, which widens what it can change. A workflow with predefined code paths keeps the set of possible actions known in advance.
  Test: Write down the last 10 cases the job handled and the steps each took. If one fixed sequence of steps would have handled all 10, build a workflow; if the next step depended on content no code path could predict, an agent is justified. Worked through on [Need an agent at all](/evaluation-checklist/need-an-agent-at-all/).
  - Anthropic, Building effective agents: "Workflows are systems where LLMs and tools are orchestrated through predefined code paths." (https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents)
  - Anthropic, Building effective agents: "we recommend finding the simplest solution possible, and only increasing complexity when needed." (https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents)
- [ ] Q02 (Scope of the job): Which production systems and which kinds of change (read, comment, ticket, configure, block, delete) is the agent allowed to touch, written down per tool?
  Excessive agency is traced to excessive functionality, permissions and autonomy. A per-tool list makes each of those reviewable.
  Test: Get the tool list and, for each tool, the system and the verbs it can use. Export the agent's credentials from the downstream system. Any verb the credential allows that the list does not name is a finding. Worked through on [Scope of change](/evaluation-checklist/scope-of-change/).
  - OWASP LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency: "The root cause of Excessive Agency is typically one or more of: excessive functionality; excessive permissions; excessive autonomy." (https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/)
  - OWASP LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency: "Limit the extensions that LLM agents are allowed to call to only the minimum necessary." (https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/)
- [ ] Q03 (Scope of the job): Does any tool give the agent an open-ended capability (run a shell command, fetch any URL) where a narrow function would do?
  Open-ended tools let the agent do things nobody reviewed. A narrow function limits the action space to the job.
  Test: Read each tool's input schema. A free-text command, query or URL field is open-ended. For each one, name the narrow function that would replace it, or record why it stays. Worked through on [Scope of change](/evaluation-checklist/scope-of-change/).
  - OWASP LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency: "Avoid the use of open-ended extensions where possible (e.g., run a shell command, fetch a URL, etc.) and use extensions with more granular functionality." (https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/)
- [ ] Q04 (Scope of the job): What identity and permissions does the agent use on each downstream system, are they the least needed (for example read-only on a log store, write on one ticket queue), and is authorization enforced by those systems rather than left to the model?
  The agent can do whatever its credentials allow, whatever its instructions say.
  Test: Read the permission list from the downstream system, not from the agent's configuration. In a test tenant, ask the agent's credential to do one write outside the job and confirm the system, not the agent's prompt, refuses it. Worked through on [Tool permissions and identity](/evaluation-checklist/tool-permissions-and-identity/).
  - OWASP LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency: "Limit the permissions that LLM extensions are granted to other systems to the minimum necessary in order to limit the scope of undesirable actions." (https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/)
  - MITRE ATLAS mitigations: "the principle of least privilege so that the agent is only granted the necessary permissions to access tools and resources required to accomplish its designated task(s)." (https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml)
  - Google, Secure AI Framework: "Tools are the external APIs and services an agent uses to take action in the world, which must be secured with least-privilege permissions." (https://saif.google/focus-on-agents)
  - OWASP LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency: "Implement authorization in downstream systems rather than relying on an LLM to decide if an action is allowed or not." (https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/)
- [ ] Q05 (Approval and handover): Which actions need a named human to approve them before they run, and which may run unattended?
  Guidance asks for approval of high-impact actions before they are taken, and for the approval rule to follow consequence.
  Test: Take the last 20 actions. For each approved one, find the approval record dated before the action. For each unattended one, find the written rule that allowed it. An action with neither is a gap. Worked through on [Human approval points](/evaluation-checklist/human-approval-points/).
  - OWASP LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency: "Utilise human-in-the-loop control to require a human to approve high-impact actions before they are taken." (https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/)
  - MITRE ATLAS mitigations: "Systems should require the user or another human stakeholder to approve AI agent actions before the agent takes them." (https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml)
  - MITRE ATLAS mitigations: "Human In-the-Loop policies should follow the degree of consequence of the task at hand." (https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml)
- [ ] Q06 (Approval and handover): Is each tool rated for risk (read or write, reversible or not, which accounts it needs), and do those ratings drive when the agent must pause?
  A rating turns the approval policy into something the harness can enforce rather than a document.
  Test: Open the tool register and check that every tool has all three attributes filled: read or write, reversible or not, and the accounts it needs. Then trigger one write-and-irreversible tool in a test tenant and confirm the harness halts for approval before the call. Worked through on [Human approval points](/evaluation-checklist/human-approval-points/).
  - OpenAI, A practical guide to building agents: "based on factors like read-only vs. write access, reversibility, required account permissions, and financial impact." (https://cdn.openai.com/business-guides-and-resources/a-practical-guide-to-building-agents.pdf)
  - OpenAI, A practical guide to building agents: "Actions that are sensitive, irreversible, or have high stakes should trigger human oversight until confidence in the agent’s reliability grows." (https://cdn.openai.com/business-guides-and-resources/a-practical-guide-to-building-agents.pdf)
- [ ] Q07 (Approval and handover): What makes the agent stop and hand over (retry limits, rate limits, unexpected tool results), and who is paged when it does?
  Limits on retries and on action rate cap the damage per unit time and give monitoring time to notice.
  Test: Find the numeric limits in configuration. In a test tenant, make a tool return the same error repeatedly and confirm the agent stops at the limit and the named person is paged within the time you set. Worked through on [Stop and handover conditions](/evaluation-checklist/stop-and-handover-conditions/).
  - OpenAI, A practical guide to building agents: "Exceeding failure thresholds: Set limits on agent retries or actions." (https://cdn.openai.com/business-guides-and-resources/a-practical-guide-to-building-agents.pdf)
  - OWASP LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency: "Implement rate-limiting to reduce the number of undesirable actions that can take place within a given time period" (https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/)
- [ ] Q08 (Approval and handover): Can the approver understand what the agent is proposing and why, and are they trained to resist over-trusting its output?
  Approval is only a control if the person can interpret the proposal, disagree and say no. Note: Article 14 applies to systems the Act classifies as high risk; for others it is a reference point only.
  Test: Show an approver 5 past proposals, 2 of them wrong on purpose. Record how many wrong ones they reject and how long each review took. Worked through on [Human approval points](/evaluation-checklist/human-approval-points/).
  - EU AI Act, Article 14: "to remain aware of the possible tendency of automatically relying or over-relying on the output" (https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/14/)
  - EU AI Act, Article 14: "to decide, in any particular situation, not to use the high-risk AI system" (https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/14/)
  - NIST AI RMF 1.0: "GOVERN 3.2: Policies and procedures are in place to define and differentiate roles and responsibilities for human-AI configurations and oversight of AI systems." (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/nist.ai.100-1.pdf)
- [ ] Q09 (Evidence and monitoring): Is every step the agent takes (inputs, intermediate decisions, tool calls with parameters, data touched, identity used) logged somewhere the agent cannot edit?
  Without a step-level record you cannot reconstruct what changed or review a disputed change.
  Test: Pick one change from last week and rebuild it from the log alone, using the five questions on the evidence page. Confirm the agent's credential has no write or delete right on the log store. Worked through on [Evidence and audit trail](/evaluation-checklist/evidence-and-audit-trail/).
  - MITRE ATLAS mitigations: "When deploying AI agents, implement logging of the intermediate steps of agentic actions and decisions, data access and tool use, installation commands, and identity of the agent." (https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml)
  - Anthropic, Building effective agents: "Prioritize transparency by explicitly showing the agent’s planning steps." (https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents)
- [ ] Q10 (Evidence and monitoring): After each change, what independent check (a query against the real system, a test, a diff) confirms the change happened as claimed, rather than trusting the agent’s own report?
  An agent can state success without having achieved it. The outcome is the state of the environment, not the transcript.
  Test: Take 10 changes the agent reported as done. Query the real system for each, without the agent's tools, and count the mismatches. Zero checked is the wrong answer even if zero mismatched. Worked through on [Verify after each change](/evaluation-checklist/verify-after-each-change/).
  - Anthropic, Demystifying evals for AI agents: "A flight-booking agent might say “Your flight has been booked” at the end of the transcript, but the outcome is whether a reservation exists in the environment’s SQL database." (https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/demystifying-evals-for-ai-agents)
  - Anthropic, Building effective agents: "it's crucial for the agents to gain “ground truth” from the environment at each step" (https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents)
- [ ] Q11 (Evidence and monitoring): What do you measure after go-live to notice that the agent’s behavior or quality has shifted, and who reviews it on what schedule?
  Behavior can change with data, model or prompt changes; the guidance asks for monitoring plans in operation.
  Test: Ask for the metric definitions (for example share of proposals accepted, share reverted, share failing the independent check), the last review date and the reviewer's name. A dashboard nobody opened in the last review period is not monitoring. Worked through on [Re-evaluate after model changes](/evaluation-checklist/re-evaluate-after-model-changes/).
  - NCSC, Guidelines for secure AI system development: "You measure the outputs and performance of your model and system such that you can observe sudden and gradual changes in behaviour affecting security." (https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development/guidelines/secure-operation-maintenance)
  - NIST AI RMF 1.0: "MANAGE 4.1: Post-deployment AI system monitoring plans are implemented" (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/nist.ai.100-1.pdf)
  - NIST AI 600-1: "MG-4.1-002 Establish, maintain, and evaluate effectiveness of organizational processes and procedures for post-deployment monitoring of GAI systems" (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.600-1.pdf)
- [ ] Q12 (Stop and roll back): Can one person stop the agent immediately, and can every class of change it makes be undone or compensated for?
  Stopping the agent is not enough if its earlier changes persist. Reversibility is also a factor in how much autonomy a tool should get.
  Test: Run a stop drill and time it from decision to the last tool call, in minutes. Then, for each class of change in the Q02 list, show the undo step or the compensating step, and run it once on a test change. Worked through on [Kill switch and rollback](/evaluation-checklist/kill-switch-and-rollback/).
  - EU AI Act, Article 14: "or interrupt the system through a ‘stop’ button or a similar procedure that allows the system to come to a halt in a safe state." (https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/14/)
  - NIST AI RMF 1.0: "to supersede, disengage, or deactivate AI systems that demonstrate performance or outcomes inconsistent with intended use." (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/nist.ai.100-1.pdf)
- [ ] Q13 (Stop and roll back): Is there an incident plan for the case where the agent itself caused the incident, with criteria for switching it off and a path for remediation?
  Guidance expects incident, escalation and remediation plans that cover the AI system, with set criteria for deactivation.
  Test: Hold a 30-minute tabletop on one scenario, such as the agent closing 40 tickets wrongly. The plan must name who decides to switch it off, on what criterion, who restores the changes and who tells the affected owners. Worked through on [Kill switch and rollback](/evaluation-checklist/kill-switch-and-rollback/).
  - NCSC, Guidelines for secure AI system development: "The inevitability of security incidents affecting your AI systems is reflected in your incident response, escalation and remediation plans." (https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development/guidelines/secure-deployment)
  - NIST AI 600-1: "MG-2.4-002 Establish and maintain procedures for escalating GAI system incidents to the organizational risk management authority when specific criteria for deactivation or disengagement is met" (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.600-1.pdf)
  - NIST AI RMF 1.0: "GOVERN 6.2: Contingency processes are in place to handle failures or incidents in third-party data or AI systems deemed to be high-risk." (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/nist.ai.100-1.pdf)
- [ ] Q14 (Evaluation): What written success criteria and test set must the agent meet for this specific job before it gets production access, and were they measured in conditions like your environment?
  Generic benchmark results do not show how the agent handles your alerts, tickets and systems.
  Test: Check that the criteria carry numbers and a date earlier than the first test run, that the test set comes from your own past findings, and that the results are attached. A published benchmark percent does not meet it; see [SWE-bench results](/benchmarks/swe-bench/). Worked through on [Success criteria and test sets](/evaluation-checklist/success-criteria-and-test-sets/).
  - Anthropic, Define success criteria and build evaluations: "Building a successful LLM-based application starts with clearly defining your success criteria and then designing evaluations to measure performance against them." (https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/test-and-evaluate/develop-tests)
  - NIST AI RMF 1.0: "MEASURE 2.3: AI system performance or assurance criteria are measured qualitatively or quantitatively and demonstrated for conditions similar to deployment setting(s)." (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/nist.ai.100-1.pdf)
  - NIST AI 600-1: "Avoid extrapolating GAI system performance or capabilities from narrow, non-systematic, and anecdotal assessments." (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.600-1.pdf)
- [ ] Q15 (Evaluation): Has the agent been run against copies or sandboxes of the systems it will change, with its write tools pointed at the copy, before any real change?
  Errors compound across steps; the vendor guidance recommends sandboxed testing alongside guardrails.
  Test: Read the endpoint each write tool is configured to call during the trial. Then compare the downstream audit log of production for the trial period: it must show no writes by the agent's identity. Worked through on [Success criteria and test sets](/evaluation-checklist/success-criteria-and-test-sets/).
  - Anthropic, Building effective agents: "The autonomous nature of agents means higher costs, and the potential for compounding errors. We recommend extensive testing in sandboxed environments, along with the appropriate guardrails." (https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents)
  - MITRE ATLAS mitigations: "Define security boundaries around agentic tools and data sources with methods such as API access, container isolation, code execution sandboxing, and rate limiting of tool invocation." (https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml)
  - NCSC, Guidelines for secure AI system development: "You release models, applications or systems only after subjecting them to appropriate and effective security evaluation such as benchmarking and red teaming" (https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development/guidelines/secure-deployment)
- [ ] Q16 (Evaluation): What re-runs the evaluation when the model version, prompt, tools or data change, and what result blocks the change from shipping?
  Changes to data, models or prompts can change behavior, so each needs the same gate as a new version.
  Test: Change the model version string in a staging pipeline and confirm the evaluation job starts without a person asking. Then lower a threshold in the test and confirm the release is blocked. Worked through on [Re-evaluate after model changes](/evaluation-checklist/re-evaluate-after-model-changes/).
  - NCSC, Guidelines for secure AI system development: "you treat major updates like new versions" (https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development/guidelines/secure-operation-maintenance)
  - NIST SP 800-218A: "C1: Consider automating tests within a development pipeline as part of regression testing where possible." (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218A.pdf)
  - Anthropic, Demystifying evals for AI agents: "Once evals exist, you get baselines and regression tests for free" (https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/demystifying-evals-for-ai-agents)
- [ ] Q17 (Data and inputs): What data can the agent read for this job, does it include production or sensitive records, and who approved that access?
  Data the agent reads can leak through its outputs and its tool calls; guidance asks for controls on sensitive data used in AI work.
  Test: List every data source in the agent's tools and compare it with what the job needs. For each source beyond that, find the approval. Sample 3 past runs and look for sensitive records in the logged context.
  - NIST SP 800-218A: "R2: Only store sensitive data used during AI model development, including production data, within organization-approved environments and locations within those environments." (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218A.pdf)
  - Google, Secure AI Framework: "including enforcing permissions on the agent’s access to tools and sensitive data" (https://saif.google/focus-on-agents)
  - CISA, Deploying AI Systems Securely: "Secure sensitive AI information (e.g., AI model weights, outputs, and logs) by encrypting the data at rest, and store encryption keys in a hardware security module (HSM) for later on-demand decryption" (https://www.ncsc.govt.nz/assets/guidance/Documents/csi-deploying-ai-systems-securely.pdf)
- [ ] Q18 (Data and inputs): Which text the agent ingests (alerts, tickets, emails, logs, web pages) can come from outside your control, and what do its tools do when such text is in context?
  Content from outside can steer an agent that has write tools. The mitigations restrict what tools may run in that state.
  Test: List each input channel and who can write to it. In a test queue, add a harmless out-of-scope request to a ticket body (for example, “close ticket X as well”) and confirm no tool call results and the log shows the text was treated as data. Worked through on [Untrusted input](/evaluation-checklist/untrusted-input/).
  - MITRE ATLAS mitigations: "It is recommended that tool invocation be restricted or limited when untrusted data enters the LLM's context." (https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml)
  - OWASP LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency: "direct/indirect prompt injection from a malicious user, an earlier invocation of a malicious/compromised extension" (https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/)
- [ ] Q19 (Build or buy): If the agent is bought or hosted by a supplier, what do you control (tools, permissions, approval gates, logs, update timing) and what does the supplier control?
  Risk is spread across third-party software, data and models, so the split needs to be written down.
  Test: Make a two-column table of tools, permissions, approval gates, logs and update timing, filled from the contract and the admin console: what you control in one column, what the supplier controls in the other. Ask the supplier in writing how much notice you get before a model change and whether you can pin a version. Worked through on [Supplier controls when buying](/evaluation-checklist/supplier-controls-when-buying/).
  - CISA, Deploying AI Systems Securely: "Require the primary developer of the AI system to provide a threat model for their system." (https://www.ncsc.govt.nz/assets/guidance/Documents/csi-deploying-ai-systems-securely.pdf)
  - NIST AI RMF 1.0: "MAP 4: Risks and benefits are mapped for all components of the AI system including third-party software and data." (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/nist.ai.100-1.pdf)
  - NCSC, Guidelines for secure AI system development: "You support users to evaluate and respond to model changes (for example by providing preview access and versioned APIs)." (https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development/guidelines/secure-operation-maintenance)
- [ ] Q20 (Build or buy): If you build, which parts (model, harness, tools, sandbox) can be swapped later, and what has the supplier told you about known limitations and failure modes?
  Separating the parts makes upgrades and exits cheaper, and stated limitations tell you what to test.
  Test: For each of the four parts (model, harness, tools, sandbox), name the interface that would let you replace it and the person who could do it in a week. File the model supplier's published limitations next to the test plan, and test each one. Worked through on [Supplier controls when buying](/evaluation-checklist/supplier-controls-when-buying/).
  - Anthropic, Scaling Managed Agents: "This allows the implementation of each to be swapped without disturbing the others." (https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/managed-agents)
  - NCSC, Guidelines for secure AI system development: "you are clear to your users about known limitations or potential failure modes." (https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development/guidelines/secure-deployment)
  - Anthropic, Building effective agents: "Frameworks can help you get started quickly, but don't hesitate to reduce abstraction layers and build with basic components as you move to production." (https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents)

## How to answer it

Answer each question once per security job, not once per product. An agent that triages findings and one that edits cloud configuration have different tools, approvers and rollback paths. A question is settled when the answer names a system, a setting or a person: "approvals are required" is not an answer, while "the change queue requires the service owner to approve any write tool, and the harness blocks the call until it does" is. For each question record the answer, a link to the setting or log that proves it, the owner and the date. Write "not applicable" with a reason rather than leaving a blank.

The scope is a team deploying an agent for one job; the use-case list names the six jobs published agents are described for. The checklist does not judge products. The test under each question is run on your own systems, in a test tenant where it writes anything.

## What the checklist does not settle

Passing all 20 does not show the agent is good at the job: that comes from the test set built under Q14, using the [guide to evaluating an agent on your findings](/guides/evaluate-a-security-agent-on-your-findings/). For the money side of buying, see the [build-versus-buy guide](/guides/build-vs-buy-ai-agents/).

## Sources

- [Anthropic, Building effective agents](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents), read 19 Nov 2026
- [OWASP, LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [OpenAI, A practical guide to building agents](https://cdn.openai.com/business-guides-and-resources/a-practical-guide-to-building-agents.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026
- [MITRE ATLAS mitigations, ATLAS data release 5.6.0 (dist/ATLAS.yaml; the current release, v2026.10, renumbers some mitigations, so IDs and wording here follow 5.6.0)](https://github.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/blob/main/dist/ATLAS.yaml), read 19 Nov 2026
- [EU AI Act, Article 14 Human oversight (artificialintelligenceact.eu)](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/14/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [NIST AI RMF 1.0 (NIST AI 100-1)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/nist.ai.100-1.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026
- [NIST AI 600-1, Generative AI Profile](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.600-1.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026
- [NIST SP 800-218A](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218A.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026
- [NCSC, Guidelines for secure AI system development: secure operation and maintenance](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development/guidelines/secure-operation-maintenance), read 19 Nov 2026
- [NCSC, Guidelines for secure AI system development: secure deployment](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development/guidelines/secure-deployment), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Anthropic, Demystifying evals for AI agents](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/demystifying-evals-for-ai-agents), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Anthropic, Define success criteria and build evaluations](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/test-and-evaluate/develop-tests), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Anthropic, Scaling Managed Agents](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/managed-agents), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Google, Secure AI Framework, Focus on Agents](https://saif.google/focus-on-agents), read 19 Nov 2026
- [NSA AISC, CISA and partners, Deploying AI Systems Securely (April 2024; copy hosted by NCSC NZ)](https://www.ncsc.govt.nz/assets/guidance/Documents/csi-deploying-ai-systems-securely.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

Canonical: https://agenticaiincybersecurity.com/evaluation-checklist/
