# One Agent or Many: Orchestration for Security Agents

Keep one agent loop until a job has independent branches or needs a second opinion. Anthropic reports agents use about 4 times and multi-agent systems about 15 times the tokens of a chat (June 2025). Slack's security team split investigations into a Director, a Critic and four experts (December 2025).

## Match the structure to the shape of the job

Anthropic's guidance is to find "the simplest solution possible" and to treat workflows as systems "orchestrated through predefined code paths", with agents reserved for work where the model must decide the next step ([Building effective agents](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents)). The table applies that to security jobs. The jobs are examples chosen for this page; the structures and their reasons come from the cited posts.

Sources: Anthropic, Building effective agents and How we built our multi-agent research system; Claude Agent SDK subagents page. Read 19 Nov 2026.

| Shape of the job | Example in security work | Structure that fits | Reason given by the source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Steps known in advance and the same every time | Enrich a new CVE with advisory text, exploitation status and asset owner, then write the ticket | Fixed workflow | Workflows "offer predictability and consistency for well-defined tasks" (Anthropic) |
| One question, a few lookups | Is this package in the production build? | Single agent loop | Anthropic's scaling rule: 1 agent with 3 to 10 tool calls for simple fact-finding |
| Inputs fall into distinct categories | Sorting alerts by type before any agent reads them | Routing step, then a specialist per category | Routing "allows for separation of concerns" and stops tuning for one input hurting another (Anthropic) |
| Independent checks on the same subject | Ask the identity, cloud, code and threat sources about one host at once | Parallel subagents, one per source | Parallel subagents finish in the time of the slowest one (Claude Agent SDK docs) |
| Open-ended, next step depends on the last finding | Alert investigation where evidence from one source decides what to ask next | Director with experts and a critic | Slack's design; Anthropic: fits "breadth-first queries" with independent directions |
| Many dependencies, shared context | A fix that touches several files that must agree | Single agent | Anthropic: coding tasks have fewer parallelizable parts, and agents are "not yet great at coordinating and delegating to other agents in real time" |

The question here is narrower: what a second agent buys and costs.

## What a second agent costs, worked through

Anthropic's figures are "about 4x more tokens than chat interactions" for agents and "about 15x" for multi-agent systems, measured on its research feature, not on security work. The arithmetic below applies the multiples to one assumed finding. The three inputs are this page's assumptions, not measurements: 10,000 tokens for a chat on one finding, a blended price of $5 per million tokens, and 2,000 findings a month.

Multiples from Anthropic, 13 Jun 2025; token count and price are assumptions. Arithmetic: 10,000 x 4 = 40,000; 10,000 x 15 = 150,000; 150,000 / 1,000,000 x $5 = $0.75.

| Structure | Tokens per finding | Cost per finding | Cost for 2,000 findings |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chat (baseline) | 10,000 | $0.05 | $100 |
| Single agent, about 4x | 40,000 | $0.20 | $400 |
| Multi-agent, about 15x | 150,000 | $0.75 | $1,500 |

The step from one agent to several adds $0.55 per finding ($0.75 less $0.20), or $1,100 over 2,000 findings. At an analyst cost of $60 an hour, which is $1 a minute, the extra agents must save about 33 seconds of analyst time per finding, or 18 hours a month, to break even on tokens alone. If the second agent only repeats work the first did, it fails that test. If it changes the outcome, for example a critic that catches a wrong finding before it reaches a person, the comparison is against the cost of the miss, which the [build vs buy guide](/guides/build-vs-buy-ai-agents/) shows how to price.

More spend also tends to buy more accuracy. Anthropic found token usage alone explained 80% of the variance on the BrowseComp evaluation, and a lead Claude Opus 4 with Claude Sonnet 4 subagents outperformed single-agent Claude Opus 4 by 90.2% on its internal research eval. Both results are about web research, so test the gain on your own findings before paying the multiple; the method is in [the evaluation harness](/agent-harness/evaluation-harness/). Running costs beyond tokens are in [the cost of running security agents](/guides/cost-of-running-security-agents/).

## How Slack split a security investigation

Slack Engineering's post of 1 Dec 2025 describes a prototype from the end of May 2025 that was "not much more than a 300 word prompt" run in a coding agent CLI. Results varied: sometimes insightful, sometimes a "convenient or spurious conclusion". Slack concluded that "prompts are just guidelines" and replaced the prompt with a chain of model calls, each with "a single, well-defined purpose and output structure" (Slack Engineering, December 1, 2025).

Roles as described in Slack Engineering, 1 Dec 2025. Read 19 Nov 2026.

| Role | Job | What it sees and returns |
|---|---|---|
| Director | Moves the investigation through discovery, trace and conclude phases; decides each time whether to advance | Poses questions; receives the Critic's condensed timeline of the most credible findings |
| Experts (Access, Cloud, Code, Threat) | Each answers from its own data sources | Returns findings; the token-heavy tool calls stay here |
| Critic | Reviews each finding against a rubric, inspecting the claims and the tool calls behind them | Annotates findings with its analysis and a credibility rating, then assembles the timeline |

Cost is part of the shape. Because each agent and task pair is a separate model call, the team varies the model by role: "low, medium, and high-cost models for the expert, critic, and director functions, respectively". The post's example report shows the Critic's value. The original alert was a command sequence, the expert called the credential handling secure, and the Critic noticed a credential exposed in a process's command-line parameters. The Director then pivoted the investigation to that. The post gives no build time, headcount or token cost, so nothing here can fill a cost line.

## Limits to set before the first run

Claude decides on its own when to spawn a subagent and how many, "and a subagent can spawn subagents of its own, so one prompt can grow into a tree of agents". The Claude Agent SDK documents three caps, available from TypeScript SDK v0.3.219 and Python SDK v0.2.127; on earlier releases "some of these limits are missing or default differently" ([subagents page](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/agent-sdk/subagents)).

Claude Agent SDK subagents page, read 19 Nov 2026. The latest claude-agent-sdk release on PyPI that day was 0.2.185.

| Cap | Setting | Default | At the limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| Depth | CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_SUBAGENT_SPAWN_DEPTH | 3 layers below the main agent; 1 stops subagents spawning their own | A bottom-layer subagent cannot spawn and does the work itself |
| Concurrency | CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_CONCURRENT_SUBAGENTS | 20 at once | Further spawns are refused with "Concurrent subagent limit reached" |
| Spend | max_budget_usd (Python), maxBudgetUsd (TypeScript) | No limit | Refuses new subagents, stops background ones and ends the query with error_max_budget_usd |

Four more rules from the same docs and the Anthropic post decide what a subagent can do:

- A subagent starts with a fresh context. "The only content you pass from parent to subagent is the Agent tool's prompt string", so the delegation text must carry every file path, identifier and decision the subagent needs.
- A tool left out of a subagent's tools list "isn't in the subagent's session at all": there is no prompt and no error, which makes an omission a quiet control. A read-only analyst gets Read, Grep and Glob and nothing else.
- Permission mode is inherited from the main session for plan, acceptEdits, auto and bypassPermissions, and a bypassPermissions value set in a subagent's own definition is never applied (Claude Code v2.1.267 or later). A plan-mode session stays in plan mode for its subagents. See [tools and permissions](/agent-harness/tools-and-permissions/).
- Anthropic's lead agents run subagents synchronously, which "simplifies coordination, but creates bottlenecks": the lead cannot steer a running subagent and waits for the slowest one.

In the OpenAI Agents SDK, "handoffs are represented as tools to the LLM" (a handoff to Refund Agent appears as transfer_to_refund_agent), so a delegation can be logged and gated like any tool call. Approvals raised inside a nested Agent.as_tool() run "still surface on the outer run", so one person works one queue; see [approvals and checkpoints](/agent-harness/approvals-and-checkpoints/) and [what to keep in run logs](/agent-harness/logging-and-evidence/).

## A delegation brief to copy

Anthropic found that short instructions like "research the semiconductor shortage" made subagents duplicate each other's searches; each needs "an objective, an output format, guidance on the tools and sources to use, and clear task boundaries". The template adds two fields of this page's own, effort cap and escalation, because Anthropic also embedded effort rules in its prompts (1 agent with 3 to 10 tool calls for simple lookups; 2 to 4 subagents with 10 to 15 calls each for comparisons).

Delegation brief (one per subagent call)

Objective: one sentence, one subject.
Output format: the fields the parent will read, as a schema.
Tools and sources: the named tools this subagent may call; nothing else is in its session.
Boundaries: what it must not do (writes, tickets, queries outside the named sources).
Effort cap: maximum tool calls and maximum tokens for this call.
Escalation: what it returns when evidence is missing or contradictory instead of guessing.

Example
Objective: Find every sign-in to host app-17 from an address outside the corporate ranges between 14 Nov 2026 00:00 and 19 Nov 2026 00:00 UTC.
Output format: JSON list of {time, account, source_address, authentication_method, evidence_id}.
Tools and sources: siem_search on the auth index only.
Boundaries: read only; account lookups only for names that appear in results.
Effort cap: 10 tool calls, 60,000 tokens.
Escalation: if the auth index has no data for part of the window, return that gap as a finding.

The parent should then treat each returned finding the way Slack's Critic does: ask what evidence supports it before acting on it.

## Sources

- [Slack Engineering, security investigations with agents, 1 Dec 2025](https://slack.engineering/streamlining-security-investigations-with-agents/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Anthropic, Building effective agents](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Anthropic, How we built our multi-agent research system, 13 Jun 2025](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/multi-agent-research-system), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Anthropic, Claude Agent SDK, Subagents in the SDK](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/agent-sdk/subagents), read 19 Nov 2026
- [Anthropic, Claude Agent SDK, Configure permissions (subagent inheritance)](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/agent-sdk/permissions), read 19 Nov 2026
- [OpenAI Agents SDK, Handoffs](https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-python/handoffs/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [OpenAI Agents SDK, Human-in-the-loop](https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-python/human_in_the_loop/), read 19 Nov 2026
- [PyPI, claude-agent-sdk release history](https://pypi.org/project/claude-agent-sdk/), read 19 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

Canonical: https://agenticaiincybersecurity.com/agent-harness/orchestration-and-subagents/
